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iii1  Introduction
Trade and Growth. There is a preponderance  of cross-country  evidence that trade
liberalization  and openness  to trade increases  the growth rate of income  and output.' In
addition,  numerous  individual  country  studies  over the past three decades  suggest that
"trade  does seem  to create,  even sustain  higher  growth"  (Bhagwati  and Srinivasan  1999).
A country's  trade policy is the key link in the transmission  of price signals  from the world
market to  the  national economy. Undistorted  price signals from world markets, in
combination  with the exchange  rate,  allow  resource  allocation  consistent  with comparative
advantage, thereby increasing productivity.  An  open trade and  investment regime
encourages  integration  into the global  trading  environment  and the import  of diverse  and
modem  technologies  that are important  for productivity  improvements. 2
Trade,  Growth  and  the Poor.  Growth  in incomes  of the poor is strongly  related  to
overall  growth in the economy-although  the relationship  differs  substantially  from country
to country.  The link of overall  growth  to poverty  alleviation  has been  demonstrated  both in
cross country analyses  (Dollar and Kraay, 2000), and for individual countries. 3 Trade
liberalization  can therefore be expected  to  help the poor overall, given the positive
association  between  openness  and growth.  As important,  the political economy  of trade
policy  is such  that in practice  it is unlikely  that the poor have  much  influence  on the pattern
of protection that prevails in a country. As trade policy inherently has the effect of
redistributing  income, this implies  that trade policy often acts to tax the poor, and that
liberalization  can therefore  do much  to improve  incomes  of the poor.  However,  in the short
run liberalization  may have a negative  impact  on some of the poor, depending  on their
sources of income  and the impact  on prices of goods and services  the poor consume.
Thus,  there  is a need  to examine  the impact  of trade  liberalization  in some  detail  to help  to
design policies that protect those among the poor who may be adversely effected,
especially  in the short  run.
Characteristics  of the Poor.  Knowledge  of how the poor obtain and how the
poor spend their income is important in designing  pro-poor policies.  As explained at
greater length in the Appendix  to this chapter,  trade policy will affect the welfare of the
poor through what they consume and what they produce. Food is by far  the most
important item of expenditure.  In Bangladesh,  for example,  food represents  about 73
percent of the total expenditures  of the poor. Fuels, housing and clothing combined
account  for about  21 percent  of expenditures. 4 The sale of unskilled  labor  tends  to be  the
most important source of  income for the poor, complemented  by the value of "own
consumption,"  that is, the imputed value of what the poor consume from their own
production. 5
' Sachs  and  Wamer  (1995),  Dollar (1992),  Edwards  (1993,  1998),  Ben David  (1993)  and Frankel  and Romer
(1  999).
3See  Coe,  Helpman  and Hoffmaister  (1997)  for evidence  and  (Romer,  1994)  for a further  discussion.
For  example,  Srinivasan  (2000)  found  that of the 17 percentage  point  reduction  in the population  below  the
poverty  line over some  40 years (between  1951-55  and 1993-94),  a 15 percentage  point reduction  is to be
attributed  to  growth  and 2 to redistributive  policies.
4From  the 1991  Household  Expenditure  Survey  for Bangladesh.
5  In Mexico,  wages from unskilled  labor  represents  40 to 45 percent  of the income  of the poor, and own
consumption  is  the next largest  at 15 percent  (lanchovichina  et al.,  2000).In general,  the impact  on the source  of income  of the poor  will be a more  important
determinant  of the effect  of liberalization  than  the effect  on the prices  of their consumption.
The reason  is that trade  reform  will affect  many  relative  prices,  some  of which  will move  in
offsetting directions. In contrast, as the poor generally have limited assets, the most
important  of which  is low-skilled  labor,  the impact  on wages  and  employment  dominates.
Complementary  Policies and Institutions.  While  a  liberal trade  policy is
necessary  for growth  and poverty  reduction,  it alone is not sufficient  for growth of trade.
When  trade reform  has been implemented  in an unstable  macroeconomic  environment  or
without efforts at  strengthening trade-related domestic institutions and  appropriate
complementary  policies,  it has often  either been reversed  or failed to stimulate  growth.  In
this chapter, we will also discuss important "behind the border' reforms that should
accompany trade liberalization  to  effectively  allow a  country to  integrate into world
markets. This includes  a regime that encourages  investment  and competition,  including
openness to foreign direct investment  (FDI), so that business  services are supplied at
competitive prices, and macroeconomic  policies that encourage stable prices and a
competitive  real exchange  rate. 
6 Although  the poor are  very diverse,  they frequently  work
in the rural sector and in the urban informal  sector.  Thus, policies  that affect agricultural
and labor  markets  are important  complements  to trade  reform  for the poor.
Political Economy  of Protection  and the Poor. Even when trade reform will
benefit the poor and the economy  broadly,  it will often be resisted.  The sectors with the
highest protection  know they receive concentrated  gains from protection  and they will
oppose the reform. The expansion  of exports following reform is likely to be spread
throughout  the economy,  often with new and sometimes  unexpected  industries  arising.  It
is often  difficult  to identify  future  exports  and exporters.  Thus,  the employment  and income
gains from reform are likely to be diffuse. The same is true for the consumers  who will
gain from the reform through lower prices and greater choice.  The diffuse nature of the
gains  to consumers  and producers  explains  why those  who oppose  liberalization  often  are
dominant  in the political lobbying.  Redistributive  effects of trade reform  can be a major
factor impeding  the launch  of welfare-improving  policy  changes  (Rodrik,  1998).
Abstracting  from fiscal revenue  considerations,  barriers  to trade  are typically  put in
place to protect domestic producers  from international  competition,  and usually benefit
powerful  interest  groups,  not the poor. Non-tariff  barriers  are especially  pernicious  in this
regard as they result in the transfer  of rents from consumers  broadly,  including  the poor,
to license  holders.  Such  rents arise because  the restriction  on imports  results  in domestic
prices that are above the world price. Whereas in the case of a tariff the government
collects the revenue  that is implied by the difference  between  the world price and the
tariff-inclusive  domestic price, in the case of non-tariff  barriers this implicit revenue is
captured  by those  who have  the right  (hold  the license)  to import.  There  is evidence  that in
developing countries such rents are a major source of inefficiency  from rent-seeking
activity  (Krueger,  1974),  i.e., from the spending  of real resources  to obtain  import  licenses
and influence  policy in general.  These license  holders are often among the wealthiest
members of  society. Thus, in addition to the  inefficiency  costs of trade protection,
protection  will often transfer income  toward  the rich and away from the poor. Indeed, in
6  One view, represented  by Rodriguez  and Rodrik (2000),  is that there is a strong association  between
exports  and growth,  but that we are unable  to be sure  whether  this association  is a consequence  of exports
causing  output  growth,  or of the two being  jointly determined  by the strength  of countries'  institutions.  Even  if
we were  to accept  this agnostic  view, the resulting  policy  prescription  is a relatively  comprehensive  approach
to development  that includes  improvement  of a range  of institutions  along  with trade  liberalization.
2percentage  terms the effect of trade reform  on the incomes  of those who currently  gain
and those who currently  lose from reform can easily be a multiple  of the economy-wide
welfare  gains  from liberalization.  This is because  trade policy  is inherently  a redistributive
policy.
Structure  of this Chapter.  In the next section  of this chapter  we describe  briefly
the experience  with successful  trade policy  reform  and discuss  adjustment  costs and the
implications  for the poor. Section III discusses  and evaluates  the principal  trade policy
instruments  and institutions.  In section  IV the most important  complementary  policies  are
discussed  and evaluated.  Given  the importance  of agriculture  and business  services  for a
poverty reduction strategy that  employs trade, these sectors are accorded special
treatment in section V. General and trade policy specific safety nets are discussed  in
section VI. We briefly  summarize  the principal  points in a successful  strategy  for using
trade for poverty reduction  in the last section.  The appendix  provides  a framework  for
thinking  about  the impact  on the poor  from a trade  reform  in the short  and the long  run. 7
2  Trade Policy Reform, Growth and Poverty Alleviation
2.1 Models of Successful Trade Integration and Poverty Reduction
In the last 40 years of the 20Qh  century,  several  countries  have been highly  successful  in
increasing  incomes  and reducing  poverty.  Most notable,  has been  the experience  of the
South-East  Asian economies,  especially  Singapore,  Hong Kong, Japan,  Taiwan (China)
and Korea.  In the final 15 years of the century,  Chile  and Mauritius  also saw remarkable
increases  in income.  All of these countries  dramatically  increased  their exports  (and  trade
to GDP ratio), raised  incomes  and reduced  poverty  and are now active  participants  in the
global trading environment.  On the other hand,  there are no examples  of countries  that
have significantly  reduced  poverty  without  significantly  increasing  their exports.  Although
export expansion  is the common  element  to all the success  stories  of poverty  reduction,
there are considerable  differences  in the models  of trade  policy  that these countries  have
adopted.  The success  stories  may be  grouped  into  three  broad  categories:
*  Economy-wide  Trade Liberalization.  Countries like Hong Kong, Singapore and
Chile adopted  very liberal trade regimes.  These  countries  avoided  non-tariff  barriers.
Hong  Kong  and Singapore  practiced  free trade  (zero  tariffs),  while  Chile  employed  low
uniform  tariffs.
*  Protection  with Offsetting  Policies  for Exporters.  Some  countries  that experienced
rapid growth  in trade and GDP did so in the context  of trade  regimes  characterized  by
significant  import  controls  on the domestic  market.  Korea,  Taiwan  (China)  and Japan
(in the  early stages) are the main examples.  The key to  understanding  these
experiences  has to do with looking  at all the factors that affect competitiveness  and
the incentives  to producers  to sell in the domestic  versus  the export  market.  Protection
'  Space  constraints  prevent  a detailed  discussion  of many  of the subjects  addressed  in this
chapter.  More  in-depth  treatments  of trade  policy  from  a development  perspective  can  be  found  on
the website  www.worldbank.org/trade  and in two recent  compilations:  McColluch,  Winters  and
Cirera  (forthcoming)  -and  Hoekman,  English  and Mattoo  (forthcoming).  The  World  Bank  site also
offers  access  to tools  that  can  be  used  to assist  in the  design  of trade  reforms,  and  cross-country
data  on  trade  policies  that  are  useful  for benchmarking  purposes.  Specific  tools  that  focus  on the
impact  of reform  on  the  poor  are  still  being  developed  and  will  be  posted  once  available.
3creates  incentives  to produce  and sell to the domestic  market,  i.e., protection  creates
a  bias against exports. Indeed, protection  of  intermediate  products and services
creates  a serious handicap  to export  industries  because  it raises  their costs to levels
that are higher  than those  of their potential  competitors  in world markets,  and they are
discouraged  through the impact  of protection  on the real exchange rate. But these
countries managed  elaborate systems  that offset the bias against exports (Box 1).
The experiences  of nearly  all other developing  countries  with high protection  of their
domestic markets are quite different. Notably,  the institutions  needed for effective
implementation  of duty drawback  systems  have been shown  to be weak in most sub-
Sahara  African  countries  (World  Bank,  2000c).  This suggests  that the Korean  model  is
not relevant  for most developing  countries  in that it is too difficult  to manage  and too
easily taken  over  by special  interests  who  will obtain  rents.
*  Protection with  Export Processing  Zones. In  a  protected trade regime that
discourages  exports, export processing  zones (EPZs) may be used to partly place
exporters  on a footing equal to producers  for the domestic  market.  While very many
countries have introduced  EPZs,  few have actually  succeeded  in stimulating  exports
substantially  and on a sustainable  basis through this mechanism  (see below). The
experience  of Mauritius  in the last 15 years  of the 20t century,  however,  provides  an
example  of a country  that expanded  exports  significantly  and reduced  poverty  through
EPZs  in a trade regime  that was not liberal  overall.  Exporters  in an EPZ  have  tariff free
access to intermediate  inputs and often have fewer regulatory  constraints  on their
actions. As a result they may are able to compete on a footing almost equal to
producers  for the domestic  market.  Although  there is a role for EPZs  in countries  with
institutional constraints (Watson, 2000), there are potential piffalls in establishing
successful  EPZs  (see  below).
Box 1. How  Korea  Overcame  the Anti-Export  Bias  of Protective  Trade  Policies
During  the 1960s  and 1970s  especially,  Korea had relatively  high import  tariffs and
also used non-tariff  barriers,  but both  exports  and the economy  grew very rapidly.  In
principle,  tariffs impose  a bias against  exports  by making production  for the home
market more profitable.  Korea managed  an elaborate  system that offset the bias
against exports.  Two of the most important  mechanisms  used by Korea  were duty-
free access  to intermediates  used in production  for export (temporary  admission)
and capital subsidies to  exporters.  Korea managed a very efficient temporary
admission system (supplemented  in the  1980s by an efficient duty drawback
system) which allowed  tariff free access  to intermediate  inputs for exporters (and
'indirect'  exporters).  Also important  was that exporters  (and indirect  exporters)  had
preferred access  to working  capital at interest rates that were considerably  lower
than  the  interest rates  paid  by  firms  supplying the  domestic market. The
development  and enforcement  of these policies  over a long period  required  strong
political will supported by a broad national consensus, and a highly competent
administration.
Source: Based on Westphal and Kim (1977), Westphal (1991) and Rhee, Ross-
Larson  and  Pursell (1984). These studies provide a  full  treatment of  the
mechanisms  employed  by Korea to provide  exporters  with incentives  to offset the
bias of the tariffs.
In practice,  the most practical  way of stimulating  trade and opening up to the
international  economy is through liberal trade regimes, rather than through a complex
4structure of  protection and export incentives.  As  a practical matter, duty drawback
mechanisms  are ineffective  in most of the least  developed  countries.  Thus, a regime  with
high protection  will diminish exports and growth. Moreover,  differentiated  structures  of
protection  and subsidization  create opportunities  for elites and powerful  producer  groups
to capture  trade  policy  for their special  interests.  This lobbying  for protection  and subsidies
engenders  corruption  and inefficiencies  which, in the end hurt the poor. These problems
can be avoided by simple and transparent  protection  regimes  of low uniform  tariffs. For
low income countries with weak trade related institutions, EPZs can be an effective
vehicle to promote  export production,  not only because  they allow duty-free  access to
imported  inputs,  but because  they provide  a means  to deal with infrastructure  and public
sector  service-related  weaknesses  that impede  investment  (Watson,  2000).
Z;;s  =Costs  of Trade Liberalization: Impact on the Poor
Trade reform may not be implemented  due to political  dynamics  or a fear of adjustment
costs. A recent review of over 50 empirical  studies of adjustment  costs by Matusz and
Tarr (2000)  found that all the evidence  supports  the view that the adjustment  costs  to the
economy  are very small in relation  to the benefits  of trade liberalization.  For example,  a
retrospective  study of trade reform in 19 developing  countries  by Papageorgiou,  Choksi
and  Michaely (1990) concluded that trade liberalization  did  not generally result in
decreased employment,  even in the short run. Compared with the  pre-liberalization
period, manufacturing  employment  was larger one year subsequent  to the completion  of
liberalization  in all but one of the twelve countries  for which data was reported. In fact,
manufacturing  employment  was higher  in twelve of thirteen  cases  during  the liberalization
period  compared  with the levels registered  prior to liberalization.  Parker  et al. (1995) and
Harrison  and Revenga  (1995) performed  similar but less extensive  studies with similar
results  for market  economies.
Although  further evidence  is needed  to generalize  these  results  fully to developing
countries-most  of the literature has focused on  industrialized  country experience-
Liedholm  and Meade (1995)  found there were very high-start up rates (twenty  percent)
for medium  and small enterprises  (MSEs) in six African economies  and the Dominican
Republic,  where MSEs account  (as they do elsewhere  as well) for a significant  portion  of
total employment.  The high start-up  rates,  where  the business  environment  is supportive,
suggest  that entrepreneurs  in these countries  are quick to respond  to new opportunities,
making speedy adjustment  to  trade reform quite likely. Looked at  another way, the
magnitude  of dislocation  caused  by liberalization  is unlikely  to be significantly  larger than
dislocations  associated  with the everyday  workings  of the economy  in many  countries.
Private  adjustment  costs can be substantial  or very small depending  on whether
displaced  workers  were earning  rents in their initial  position  and whether  markets  function
reasonably  well. The poor  are not likely  to be earning  rents  or they would  not be poor.  The
evidence shows that  adjustment costs are typically short term and terminate when
workers find a job, while the benefits of trade reform  can be expected  to grow with the
economy.  In developing  economies,  trade liberalization  should  favor labor since exports
will typically be labor intensive.  Significant  within-industry  shifts  typically  occur after trade
liberalization,  which tend to minimize  the dislocation  of factors of production.  Moreover,
the duration of unemployment  for most industries  is not high, especially  where workers
were not earning substantial  rents in the original  job. Finally, in many industries  normal
labor turnover exceeds dislocation  from trade liberalization,  so that downsizing  where
necessary  could  be accomplished  without  causing  much  unemployment.
5It is difficult to disentangle  the effects of trade liberalization  from other events
occurring  simultaneously,  but generally  manufacturing  employment  increased  subsequent
to the trade liberalization.  Thus, while it is necessary  to apply caveats to most of the
individual  studies,  the collective  weight  of their evidence  suggests  that adjustment  costs
are low relative  to the gains  from trade  liberalization.  Nonetheless,  the extreme  poor may
be incapable  of sustaining  even short periods  with adverse  adjustment  costs, and there
may be selected  poor groups  that do not gain, while  some  of those that gain may lose in
the short run. In order to minimize  adjustment  costs and help make  trade reform work
most effectively  for the poor, complementary  policies are necessary. One important
complementary  policy  for the poor is an efficient  social safety net (discussed  below).  In
general, attaining and sustaining a  high rate of economic growth is a  key factor in
improving  outcomes  for the poor over  time.
NKM  9-.6t  ,  Emma
The first step in designing  a strategy  to use  trade  policy  for growth  and poverty  alleviation
is to understand  how the trade regime  works.  This involves  learning  of the importance  of
non-tariff  barriers,  including  who gets the licenses  and permits.  What is the structure of
the tariff and including  its dispersion,  exemptions  and rebates?  How  much revenue  comes
from tariffs? What policies are in place which may tax or subsidize  exports?  Are trade-
related institutions, such as  standards organizations,  export finance and  marketing
facilities adequate  to support an expansion  of exports? Does the pattern of protection
favor the income  of the poor or a segment  of the poor, and may policies be designed  to
assist  the poor  during  the transition?
In this section we describe the principal trade policies and institutions that are
employed  to influence  the flow of goods  and services  and suggest  how to evaluate  these.
We discuss  complementary  policies  in later  sections.
Non-tariff  barriers  include mechanisms  such as quotas, licenses  and monopoly  rights to
import.  When these mechanisms  are in place  for reasons  other  than for health or safety
they are the most pernicious  of trade barriers  in terms of their harm  to growth and poverty
alleviation.  Partly this is because non-tariff  barriers encourage  competing interests to
lobby  to obtain  the valuable  licenses  to import.  This competing  lobbying  activity  (known  as
urent-seeking")  wastes  valuable  resources. Non-tariff  barriers  also lack transparency,  and
thereby may allow  protection  to go relatively  unnoticed.  As discussed  above, the political
economy  of protection  suggests  that import  controls  (and sometimes  export controls)  are
usually  put in place  to benefit  powerful  interest  groups,  not to help the poor.
Most low-income  developing  countries  have differentiated  tariff structures  with significant
tariff escalation  (Michalopoulos,  1999).  The main reasons  include  fiscal objectives,  import
substitution motivations  combined with the  political weight of vested interests. Tariff
escalation  is a problem  since it affords  high  "effective"  protection  to final goods producers,
thereby  discouraging the  development of  intermediate industries.  Exporting  of
intermediate  products  is an important  way for developing  countries  to participate  in the
modern  global  economy;  but  these activities  are discouraged  by the escalation  of tariffs.
6A uniform  tariff conveys  a number  of advantages  (Tarr,  2001),  the most important
of which  is that if the tariff is uniform,  the gains  to industry  lobbying  are much  smaller  (and
may be negative), creating a kind of free-rider problem  for the lobbying industry and
dramatically  reduces  the incentive  to lobby  for protection.  Chile,  which has had a uniform
tariff since 1979,  is a dramatic  case  in point.  In Chile,  in 1998,  the legislature  considered  a
progressive  reduction  of the uniform  tariff  from 11  to 6 percent,  to be  accomplished  by one
percent per year reductions  though  2003. Chilean  industry  groups supported  a reduction
of  the  tariff,  which  passed the  Chilean legislature. Evidently, uniform tariffs  led
industrialists  to conclude  that a reduction  was  in their collective  interest.
A uniform  tariff  greatly  simplifies  customs  operations,  eliminates  a number  of ways
used to  avoid paying the tariff, and should help reduce corruption  (which may have
positive  spillover  effects  into other  dimensions  of government  activity)  and save  on scarce
administrative  resources.  There will also be a direct saving of resources  from reduced
lobbying for  higher protection, and  an  associated gain  from  encouraging scarce
entrepreneurial  talent to be employed  more productively  in the creation of better and
cheaper  products.  Overall,  the level of protection  is likely to be lower as the incentive  to
lobby for higher  tariffs is attenuated.  Many  of these  factors are pro-poor  as they greatly
reduce  the scope  for the exercise  of power  and rent-seeking.
Customs and other officials in low-income  countries have tended to argue that
although  uniform  tariffs look good in theory,  implementing  such a structure  is not feasible
in practice. This is frequently  a covert argument  for continued protection  of particular
sectors. In fact, in addition to Chile, El Salvador  and the Kyrgyz Republic have tariff
structures  with very small dispersion,  and Hong Kong, Singapore  and Estonia have a
uniform  tariff of zero.
Uniformity  does not imply  that that there  can be no exemptions  for products  that are
deemed  to be of great social importance  such as essential  medicines  or mosquito  nets
(Bannister and Thugge, 2001). However,  care should be taken that such exceptions
target  only products  that are critical  to attain  social  and public  health  objectives.
3.3 Emergency Protection, Antidumping and Other Trade Remedies
Liberalization  of  trade will give rise to  adjustment pressures as  import competition
intensifies.  For this reason  reform programs  often reduce  tariffs and other  trade barriers
gradually  and  are  ideally  complemented by  measures to  facilitate  adjustment
(complementary  reforms-see below).  However,  in some instances  imports  may expand
so rapidly  that governments  may want to be able to intervene  by raising  trade barriers.
Import surges that create serious difficulties  for a domestic industry may also occur
independent  of liberalization.  In such cases  trade intervention  may be the most effective
instrument  available  to governments.  If so, the appropriate  action to take is a so-called
safeguard  measure-the imposition  of a temporary  duty against  all imports  of the product
concerned.  A necessary  condition  for intervention  should  be that the domestic  industry  is
seriously  injured  by import  competition,  and a determination  by economic  decision  makers
that protection  is in the national  interest  (i.e., the associated  costs to consumers  are less
than the  benefits that  would accrue to  producers). Safeguard actions should be
temporary,  lasting no more  than 2 or 3 years, as the objective  is not to raise protection
permanently  but to facilitate  adjustment  by the industry  to increased  competition.  It is also
important  that tariffs  be used,  not quotas,  for transparency  and political  economy  reasons.
7Many countries  tend to use antidumping  as a safeguard  instrument.  This is ill
advised. Antidumping  is a trade policy instrument  that allows  duties to be imposed  on
imports  that are sold for less  than what  is charged  in the exporters  home market.  That is,
it can be invoked  to offset price discrimination  across  markets.  Such differential  pricing
usually  reflects  economic  conditions,  and is not detrimental  to welfare.  As antidumping  is
an instrument that is easily captured by industries  to raise the price of imports, and
requires  the use of scarce administrative  resources,  it is counterproductive  to economic
development  and poverty  reduction.  If there  is a need  to raise protection  because  imports
injure  domestic  industry,  it is preferable  to use  WTO consistent  safeguard  actions,  as they
allow the country to consider  the impact of taking action on the economy  as a whole,
including  the poor, as opposed  to simply the industry  that confronts  import  competition. 8
Antidumping  procedures  typically replace considerations  of the national interest or the
impact on the poor with an assessment  of pricing  practices  of foreign  firms. That is, the
question  of whether it is in the nation's interest  to offer protection  to the industry under
consideration  for a duty is never  asked.
The best policy option  from a development  perspective  in this area is to have no
antidumping  instrument.  If antidumping  procedures  are adopted,  efforts  should be made
to establish  procedures  that allow  for the national  interest  and the impact  on the poor to
be taken  into account  prior  to the imposition  of an  antidumping  duty.
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Tariffs on imports hurt exports in various ways. Tariffs reduce the demand  for foreign
exchange,  and that tends to appreciate  the real exchange rate. The appreciated  real
exchange rate hurts exporters  and competitiveness  of national  firms as they must pay
higher prices  for their imported  intermediates.  Prices  of labor and capital are also bid up
by import  competing  sectors  that are  favored  by the tariff.
Programs  like duty drawback  and temporary  admission,  if properly  administered,
allow exporters duty-free access to imported intermediates. Although the exchange  rate
bias against  exports  that results  from protection  remains, 9 provision  of tariff-free  access  to
imported intermediates  for exporters  is crucial. This is also the case for countries with
uniform  tariffs,  although  the need  for duty-free  access  declines  as the average  level  of the
tariff  falls.
The principal  problem  with duty drawback  schemes (involving  the repayment  of
duties paid on imported inputs that are embodied  in subsequent  exports) is that their
administration  can be very costly, and lead  to cumbersome  procedures  and delays when
tariffs are high. Exporters  complain  of delays and lack of re-payment  in many countries.
When tariffs are high there is also the risk of fraudulent  claims.  The empirical  evidence
suggests  that in countries  without well-functioning  public administrations,  duty drawback
becomes  ineffective.  They are very difficult  to administer  at tariff rates in excess of 15 or
20 percent because  of leakage,  delays in payment  and fraudulent  claims (Mitra, 1992).
8 Under  the  WTO,  safeguards  also  require  compensation  to be  offered  to exporting  countries  if the
action  lasts  more  than  3 years.  This  is a useful  mechanism  to ensure  that  protection  is temporary.
See  Hoekman  and  Kostecki  (2001)  for more  detailed  discussion.
9  In addition,  to avoid  anti-export  bias,  duty  drawback  schemes  would  have  to be extended  to indirect
exporters  as  well  (i.e.,  firms  which  do not  export  themselves  but  which  sell  to exporters).  Administration  of
such  mechanisms  are  quite  complicated  in  practice  for  most  developing  countries..
8Delays are particularly  detrimental  to small and medium enterprises  and small farmer
organizations.
Temporary admission may be more effective at allowing tariff free access to
intermediate  inputs for exporters in these situations  as they do not involve  payment of
duties on imported  inputs,  but rather  a requirement  that firms  document  ex post  that these
inputs have been used in the production  of exports.  The major potential  problem  with  this
approach  in low-income  countries  with weak administrative  capacity  is so-called  leakage
of goods into the economy (that is, the goods are not used for export production).  A
frequently  used option to control such leakage  is the bonded  warehouse,  or on a greater
scale, an export processing  zone. These are specific  territories that are controlled by
customs  and where imports  are not taxed on entry, but goods are taxed if sold into the
domestic  market.  Export  processing  zones  are  discussed  further  below.
3.5 Export Subsidies
Export subsidies  may be appropriate  to offset  market  failures, for example,  information
problems  associated  with breaking into new markets by individual  firms. In practice,
countries  have often used them indiscriminately  to promote  exports  and to offset  the anti-
export  bias created  by other  policies.  While they  can stimulate  exports,  they may  do so at
a huge cost to the budget.  From a poverty  perspective  their impact  on the poor may be
detrimental  as they may result  mostly  in rents  to relatively  rich exporters.  Using subsidies
to  offset the  negative effect of  other policies (such as  protection) on exports is
inappropriate.  Such situations call for the removal of protection and the adoption of
instruments  such as drawback  or EPZs.
Developing  country  WTO members  have  become  more constrained  in the use of
export subsidies,  but least developed  countries  and countries  with per capita incomes
below  $1000  are permitted  to use them. This provides  legal cover  to pursue  policies  that
aim to offset informational  asymmetries  and related  market  failures. To be effective  and
not distort  incentives,  such  policies  should  be 'horizontal'  in nature,  not sector-specific.
The main problem  with export  subsidies  is their use by high-income  countries  for
agricultural  commodities.  This has a destabilizing  effect on world prices and is highly
detrimental  to producers  in developing  countries  of the products  concerned  (see  below).
3.6  Export Taxes
Developing  countries  often impose  export  taxes on primary  commodity  exports.  In some
cases  these are imposed  instead  of royalties  for the extraction  of minerals;  in others  they
are used in an attempt  to exercise  market  power  or to support  local  processing  industries.
In such  cases  there is often  an adverse  effect  on the poor (Box  2).
Export taxes result in a lower price for the farmers than the prevailing  price in
world markets for their commodities.  Elimination  of the tax will raise the incomes of
farmers, the  majority of  whom tend to  be poor, and reduce the profitability of  the
established  processing facilities. The latter may employ poor urban labor. Examples
include  cocoa  and coffee processors  in West  Africa  that obtain  cocoa and coffee  beans  at
prices below  the export  price;  textile  firms in Pakistan,  India  and Francophone  West Africa
that obtain  domestic  cotton at favorable  prices  from parastatal  export  monopolies  or as a
result of export  taxes or restrictions;  leather processing  firms in India that buy local and
9partly processed  hides at low prices as a result of cascading  export  taxes; cashew  nut
processors in Mozambique  that benefit from export taxes on raw cashew nuts; and
cashmere  wool processors  in Mongolia  that benefit  from the price reducing  effect of an
export tax on raw cashmere. In all these cases  the export taxes and restrictions  are
economically inefficient because they reduce the  incentive to  produce the  primary
agricultural  product  relative  to the incentive  to process  it.
In most cases,  the net effect  on poverty  of removing  export  taxes and restrictions
will be strongly  positive.  There  are many  more  poor  farmers  that would  benefit  from export
tax removal  than there  are industrial  workers  who might  lose,  and the highest  incidence  of
the most severe  poverty  is usually  found in rural areas.  For example,  the cashmere  export
tax in Mongolia  reduces  the incomes  of about  250,000  goat-herding  families,  the majority
of which are poor, with the poorest heavily  dependent  on income  from cashmere. In
contrast, there  are only  about 2,000 workers employed in  cashmere processing.
Moreover,  part of the income  the export  tax transfers  from the goat herders  goes to the
owners of the processing  firms (Filmer,  2001; and Takacs, 1994).1i  As is generally  the
case, safety net policies  for those  adversely  impacted  by export  tax elimination  should  be
carefully  considered,  especially  when  the impact  on processors  is severe.
Box 2: Madagascar's  Marketing Board for Vanilla Exports:  Taxing the poor
In 1960  the international  market  for natural  vanilla  was dominated  by Madagascar,
the World's lowest cost-producer  of high-quality  bourbon vanilla. From its dominant
position of 60 percent of world exports of natural vanilla, Madagascar  organized the
bourbon vanilla cartel with Comoros and  Reunion, sefting high export prices and
restricting  supply  by regulating  its domestic  market  through  a Marketing  Board  which  fixed
low producer  prices  and required  licenses  to grow,  prepare  and export  vanilla.
If the Marketing  Board  was  to be assessed  by the effect  it had on export  prices of
vanilla from Madagascar,  it was a clear success.  The export price of vanilla increased
from US$10  in the late 60s to more  than US$  65 per kilo in the early 90s. However,  the
share of Madagascar  in world markets  declined  to 30 percent as Indonesia  (outside  the
cartel)  took advantage  of high  world prices  to develop  a high  export  capacity.  The entry of
Indonesia into world markets left the total value of  Madagascar's  exports constant
throughout  the 1970s  and 80s. The Board's  interventions  in the domestic  market had a
similar  effect  on producer  prices,  which  fluctuated  around  US$5  per kilo during  the 1980s.
Who benefited  from the bourbon  vanilla  cartel  and the marketing  board's  domestic
policies? Indonesian  producers  were the winners, Madagascar's  producers  the losers.
These were small producers  (60,000),  with an average  production  of 130 kilos and an
average  income  of US$650  per plantation.  Estimates  of producer  prices that would have
prevailed in Madagascar  had the marketing  board been abolished  are close to US$26,
well above the US$5 price fixed by the board. Taking into account the  increase in
production that such a change in prices would have generated, abolition  would have
increased  vanilla  producer  surplus  eight-fold.
'° Much  of cashmere  is smuggled  out of the  country.  While  this avoids  the tax,  herders  still lose
income  as  middlemen  capture  much  of the  difference  between  world  and  domestic  prices.
10An alternative to free-trade would have been to  eliminate intervention  in the
domestic  market,  but to continue  to exploit  market  power  in international  markets  through
an export tax. Estimates  suggest  that the optimal  export  tax would have been close to
US$25  per kilo instead  of the US$61  implicit  tax that was imposed  on producers.
Why where these policies  not adopted?  A possible  explanation  is that taxation of
small producers  generated  an important  income  redistribution  from the rural poor to the
urban  elite.
Source:  De Melo,  Olarreaga  and  Takacs  (2000).
3.7 Export Processing Zones (EPZs)
EPZs are "enclaves"  for export production,  especially  non-traditional  exports, that are
often used in contexts  where  economy-wide  trade  reform  is impeded  or infrastructure  and
regulatory  requirements  cannot  be met on a national  basis.  Effective  EPZs  combine  clear
private property rights and investment  regulations,  no restrictions  on foreign exchange,
tariff free  imports for  export production, moderate levels of  taxation, streamlined
administrative  procedures  and private  sector  management.  Some of the most successful
EPZs are in Mauritius where, in  1994, EPZs generated 71% of gross exports and
employed 16.6%  of the work force. Mexico has also had successful  EPZs. Such zones
can not only expand exports, but may also have a significant  effect in raising female
employment.  Bangladesh  zones employ a majority  of women (70% of Chittagong  EPZ
employees  are women,  a much  higher  ratio  than  the national  average).  In the Dominican
Republic,  EPZ employment  was an important  factor in decreasing  the share of female
poor  from 22.6 percent  to 15.8  percent  over  the 1986-93  period  (Madani,  1999).
Experience has  shown that  development of  EPZs, including provision of
infrastructure  and management,  should be privately handled. Publicly developed  and
managed EPZs have typically been unsuccessful.  Attracting  investment  into EPZs is a
function  of many  factors,  including  some  that are national-such as political  stability  and
sound macroeconomic  management.  An  overvalued  exchange rate will  discourage
exporting from EPZs just as much as from the rest of the economy. In general, the
conditions  that make EPZs  successful  involve  the same  complementary  policies  that are
required to make a trade reform successful  (see below). Consequently,  EPZs are best
regarded  as transitional  mechanisms  in the pursuit  of an overall  liberal  trade regime.
3.8 Other Trade Related  Institutions
In addition  to the commercial  policy instruments  discussed  above,  there are a number  of
other  trade-related  institutions  that can have important  implications  for the impact  of trade
reforms.  These  include  customs  clearance,  export  finance,  product  standards  and access
to information  on market  opportunities.
Customs  Clearance  efficiency  and transparency  is an important determinant  of
the costs associated  with trade. Burdensome  and redundant  procedures-red tape-can
give rise to  substantial uncertainty  and are often associated  with rent seeking and
corruption. Minimizing discretion by simplifying as  much as possible the  clearance
process,  including  through adoption  of international  standards  for classification  of goods,
elimination of most exemptions  (see below) and providing officials with training and
appropriate  information  technology  are important  dimensions  of trade  reform.
11Export finance is one of the major constraints  inhibiting exports in many low
income developing  countries.  Inadequacies  may result  from the overall  weakness  of the
financial sector or may reflect difficulties  in assessing  creditworthiness  of traders or
because  traders  do not have  sufficient  assets  to be  judged  creditworthy.  To the extent  that
the poor are involved  in trading activities,  they may face special  difficulties  in obtaining
access  to the trade  credit  they need-just as they face such  difficulties  in accessing  other
parts of the financial sector. While ensuring  availability  of trade finance is a matter  that
needs to  be left to the private sector, any effort to  expand exports and to promote
increased  opportunities  for the poor in the export sector needs to investigate  whether
credit is a problem. Remedies  should be sought as part of overall efforts to increase
access  to finance  for low-income  producers.  These  are discussed  elsewhere  in the PRSP
sourcebook
Product standards based on  international  norms are important to  poverty
reduction.  When standards  are used appropriately  in international  trade (as well as in
domestic  transactions),  they facilitate  interconnection  of goods  and information  exchange,
and guarantee  safety,  health,  quality  or the environment.  As the poor have less access  to
information  and do not have the resources  to buy higher  quality  goods and services,  they
are  more  dependent  on efficient  standardization  and consumer  protection  regimes.
In the area of trade,  developing  countries  face a dual challenge:  on the one hand
they need to reform  regulations  and establish  efficient  testing, certification,  and laboratory
accreditation  requirements  to minimize  the impact  on trade while still attaining  sanitary,
phytosanitary,  and  product standards. Low-income developing countries need both
technical  and financial assistance  to meet  this objective.  Institutional  arrangements  need
to be developed  to ensure  that poor  firms (such  as farmers,  small  producers  and artisans)
have access to standards organizations-through co-operatives  and similar collective
organizations-and are not unduly penalized  by the use of labor-intensive  production
technologies.
Marketing of exports internationally  is a  challenging task for  all  low-income
countries.  They have to overcome  problems  of lack of information,  product and country
recognition,  and concerns about quality. Foreign partners and FDI can be helpful in
providing  the necessary  contacts  and advice;  but frequently  it is necessary  to organize  a
local association of exporters or producers.  When the producers  tend to  be a large
number  of small poor farmers, co-operatives  and similar  ventures can be very helpful in
ensuring  that the potential  benefits  from exports  are realized  by the poor. But competition
in these  institutions  is important  or poor  farmers  may  receive  lower prices  for their outputs
Most  developing countries have  formed or  are  members of  regional integration
agreements  (RIAs). From an efficiency  of resource allocation  viewpoint, RIAs between
developing countries (so-called South-South  agreements)  are likely to  hurt member
countries  (World  Bank,  2000b).  The reason  is that the trade preferences  typically  displace
efficiently produced low-priced imports from  non-partner countries with  inefficiently
produced  high-priced  products  from partner  countries." 1 A solution  to this problem  is for
member countries  to lower their external  trade barriers,  thereby reducing  the inefficient
11 The  impact  of North-South  or North-North  agreements  tends  to also  involve  more  efficiently  priced  imports
from  partner  countries  and thus may  be beneficial.
12displacement  of non-partner  country  imports.  In fact, a harmful  RIA can be turned into a
beneficial  one by lowering  external  trade  barriers  sufficiently.
From the viewpoint of poverty, the effects of an agreement  among developing
countries are  likely to  be  asymmetric, with  the  poorer member countries losing
significantly  and the higher  income  members  likely  to gain (World  Bank,  2000b).  This is, in
part,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  relatively developed country produces protected
manufactures  that are imported  on balance  by the less  developed  country.  With a RIA,  the
more  advanced  country  sells its protected  manufactures  at a higher  price since its exports
are no longer  subject to a tariff in the poorer  country's  markets.  This entails a terms-of-
trade loss for the poorer country, since it pays a higher price to its partner country  for
imports  it could buy more  cheaply  from the rest of the world. This problem  of asymmetric
distribution  of gains and losses emerged  in the 1960s  in the East African Community--
where Kenya gained and Tanzania and Uganda lost--and in the  Central American
Common  Market-where El Salvador  gained and Honduras  lost. In both cases,  the more
advanced  country resisted  extemal tariff reduction,  which led to resentment  in the less
developed  member  countries  and a breakdown  in implementation  of the agreements.
Lowering  external  trade barriers  is beneficial  both from the viewpoint  of efficiency
and from the viewpoint  of minimizing  the losses for the poorer  member  country. In fact,
the  losses from  regionalism,  both in overall efficiency and in  adverse distributional
consequences, can  be  reduced by  lowering external trade barriers. In  terms  of
implementation,  in the case  of a free trade agreement  (such as the planned  Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas or the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement),  each country can
lower  its tariffs  independently,  and can  thus protect  itself  from adverse  consequences.  For
a  customs union (such as  the  West  African Economic and  Monetary Union or
MERCOSUR),  the member countries  must agree  to jointly lower the common extemal
tariff. Thus, customs unions among developing  countries should be approached  very
cautiously,  since tariff policy  is taken  out of the hands  of national  policy-makers.
Space constraints prohibit a detailed discussion  of the WTO, which has many
provisions that  constrain the  use  of  trade-related policies by  members, including
developing  countries (Box 3). See www.worldbank.org/trade  and www.wto.org  for more
information  and references  to the literature.  A major dimension  of the WTO that makes  it
relevant from a  poverty perspective  is that it  provides a potent mechanism  for  the
reciprocal liberalization  of trade barriers. Although most major industrialized  markets
provide preferential access for  exports from  developing countries, especially least
developed  nations,  trade  restrictions  remain  prevalent  especially  for agricultural  products,
apparel  and other  labor-intensive  products.
Box  3. WTO and Poverty  Alleviation
The WTO agreements  involve  legal  commitments  by governments  regarding  the rules and
policies  they follow in the conduct of international  trade in goods and services. As such,
the Agreements  contain no explicit references  or direct links to policies  affecting  poverty.
Their impact  derives  from the trade policies  that governments  have committed  to pursue
based on their WTO commitments.  More than 100 of the  140 WTO members are
developing  countries  (although  the WTO does not define what constitutes  a developing
nation-this is largely  left to self-selection).  Almost  all the 30+ countries  seeking  to accede
are also developing  countries  or economies  in transition.
13Within the WTO agreements, developing countries are supposed to  receive
special and more favorable  treatment  (usually referred  to as "Special and Differential"
Treatment)  aimed at addressing  their particular  circumstances  in international  trade. The
poorest of  the developing  countries-the 49 countries  on the UN list of least developed
countries (LDCs) are provided with further additional more favorable treatment. The
Special  and Differential  Treatment  provisions  involve  five sets of measures:  (a) developing
countries  are given more  flexibility  in terms  of their own trade  policies-e.g. they have not
had to reduce  their tariffs significantly  in previous  multilateral  trade negotiations  and they
do not have to 'bind' all their tariffs; (b) their exports  can be charged  lower preferential
tariff rates in developed  or other developing  country  markets; (c) they are given longer
'transition' periods to  implement  provisions  contained in some WTO Agreements; (d)
developed  countries  are  supposed  to provide  them  with technical  assistance  to help them
implement  the commitments  they have assumed; and (e) developed  countries are to
implement their WTO commitments in  a  manner 'favorable' to  developing country
interests.
WTO provisions in general, and those which apply to developing countries in
particular,  tend to be quite permissive  in terms of the trade policies an individual  country
can pursue-and  hence  do not tend to constrain  these policies  in ways that would harm
the poor. On the contrary,  they are on the whole supportive  of trade and foreign direct
investment policies that  would tend to  promote poverty alleviation. Moreover, the
availability  in the WTO of an effective  dispute  settlement  mechanism  and the guarantee  of
MFN treatment  for all its members  can be  of special  importance  to developing  countries  in
their dealings  with more  powerful  developed  country  trading  partners.  Thus, it is important
for all developing  countries  to be members  of the WTO.
At the  same time, the  permissiveness  of the WTO  Special and Differential
Treatment provisions has been a  problem for  LDCs. This has enabled developing
countries  to maintain  higher levels of domestic  protection,  which has harmed  their own
economies.  And, export  subsidies--  often used to offset  the disincentives  of protection-
are a drain to the budget, and hence are not affordable,  and can not be relied upon to
provide sustainable,  labor  intensive  export  growth  that helps  alleviate  poverty.
Source: For more on the WTO, see http://www.wto.org/.  Hoekman  and Kostecki  (2001)
provide a general introduction; McCulloch,  Winters and Cirera (2001) focus on the
poverty-related  dimensions  of many  WTO agreements.
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Trade liberalization  involves  reducing discrimination  against foreign suppliers of goods
and services.  This is achieved not simply by eliminating  quotas and reducing average
tariffs and dispersion  across  tariffs, but also by strengthening  trade-related  institutions,  in
particular  customs  and standards  bodies.  In addition,  complementary  policies  are needed
to support  trade  reform.
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To be sustained  and contribute  to an efficient  allocation  of resources,  trade liberalization
must be supported by a stable macroeconomic  environment and a competitive real
exchange  rate. Trade reform works through  the transmission  of price signals.  These are
14concealed in a regime of  high and variable inflation. Thus, macro-stability  is a  key
complementary  policy. 12
A competitive  real exchange  rate is also crucial  to create  conditions  for continued
support of liberal trade policies.  With an overvalued  exchange  rate, import competing
industries  are at a competitive  disadvantage,  and this generates  political pressures  for
protection  that are difficult  to withstand  in the face of rising trade deficits  and declining
foreign  exchange  reserves  (Shatz  and  Tarr,  2001  provide  a more  general  treatment).
Initially,  trade liberalization  is likely to lead to a trade deficit because  the rise in
imports  tends to occur  faster than the export  supply  response.  A depreciation  of the real
exchange  rate will help to restore  a balance  between  exports  and imports  since it makes
imports  more expensive  and exports  are more profitable  in domestic  currency.  Under a
flexible exchange  rate regime,  the real exchange  rate will adjust through  market  forces.
Under  a fixed  exchange  rate regime,  significant  trade reform  should  be accompanied  by a
devaluation  of the domestic  currency.  The required  depreciation  is larger  the greater the
extent of trade liberalization  and the greater the lags in the supply response (see
Appendix).
Without recommending  any particular  type of exchange  rate regime,  we note that
some developing  countries  are participants  in a currency  zone,  which limits  their capacity
to devalue-an example  is provided  by the countries  in West and Central  Africa who are
members  of the CFA zone. Due primarily  to currency  overvaluation,  in the CFA zone
between  1986  and 1994  there was  no economic  growth,  when  other Sub-Saharan  African
countries  were growing  at 2.5 percent  annually  (Clement,  1994).  In fact, for some of the
CFA countries (e.g., Cameroon,  Cote d'lvoire) the  overvaluation  induced an  output
contraction  between  1986 and 1994  comparable  to the Great Depression  in the United
States  (Shatz  and Tarr, 2001).  A number  of CFA  countries  also  suffered  large  increases  in
poverty (Devarajan  and Hinkle, 1994).  After the devaluation  of 1994, growth strongly
resumed. Some countries seek to  maintain a  fixed  exchange rate  through the
establishment  of  a currency board or some other arrangement  (e.g., Argentina and
Estonia). In such countries, to contain output losses,  trade liberalization  may have to
proceed  at a pace  consistent  with  the feasible  rate of real exchange  rate  depreciation.
4.2 Fiscal Revenue  and the Design of Tariff Reform
In 1990, collected  trade taxes as a percent  of GDP averaged  0.6 percent  among OECD
countries and 4.4 percent among non-OECD  countries. 13 Policy makers in low-income
countries  may be concerned  that reform  might substantially  reduce  government  revenue,
yielding  larger  fiscal  deficits  and inducing  inflation.  While these  concerns  have  some  merit,
trade reform need not entail diminished  revenues.  Many countries have implemented
successful  trade reform  programs  without  significant  loss of revenue.  For example,  in the
12 The  relative  price  of tradable  to non-tradable  (or home)  goods,  Pt/Ph,  is typically  referred  to as
the real exchange  rate  (RER)  and is used  as a measure  of the competitiveness  of the tradable
sector.  The  reason  is that  several  of the  determinants  of Ph (such  as  wages)  affect  the  production
costs  of tradables.  Oversimplifying  for purposes  of illustration,  suppose  a govemment  runs  a fiscal
deficit  and  finances  it by printing  money.  The  resulting  inflation  raises  prices  in the non-tradable
sector.  If tradable  prices  do not  increase  by  the  same  amount,  inflation  lowers  Pt/Ph  and  thus  the
real  exchange  rate,  thereby  reducing  the  competitiveness  of the  tradable  sector.  See  the  Annex.
13  Trade taxes as a percent  of GDP  were:  5.3 percent  in Africa,  4.4 percent  in Asia,  and 3.5 percent  in the
Middle  East.  Ebrill  et al. (1999).
151990s, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and  Malawi implemented  trade reforms without a
significant  loss  in revenue  as a percent  of GDP  (Ebrill  et al., 1999).
Perhaps  the foremost  reason  why  trade  reform  need  not lead to a loss  of revenue
is that developing  countries  have traditionally  relied heavily  on quantitative  restrictions  of
imports.  Government  revenue  increases  when quantitative  restrictions  are converted  into
tariffs. Reduction  of tariffs  should  start with the highest  ones.  Also, where tariff rates are
very high initially,  they will generate  little or no revenue.  Reductions  of the tariffs to more
moderate  levels will increase  imports  and thus revenues,  as the incentive  to smuggle  is
reduced.  Moreover,  exemptions  often are a significant  source  of revenue  loss and their
reduction  increases  tariff collections.  Finally,  an exchange  rate  depreciation,  which  should
accompany  significant  tariff reduction,  will raise the local currency  value of imports and
thus tariff revenue.
Box  4.  Summary  of Revenue  Impacts  of Trade  Liberalization
Trade  Reform  Expected  Revenue  Impact
Replace  NTBs  with  tariffs  Positive
Eliminate  tariff  exemptions  Positive
Eliminate  trade-related  subsidies  Positive
Reduce  tariff dispersion  Ambiguous/Positive
Eliminate  state  trading  monopolies  Ambiguous/Positive
Reduce  high average  tariffs  Ambiguous
Lower  maximum  tariff  Ambiguous
Reduce  moderate  or low average  tariffs  Negative
Eliminate  export  taxes  Ambiguous/Negative
Source:  Sharer  et al. (1998).
When tariffs rates are already uniform and in the moderate  to low range, then
further tariff reduction is likely to result in revenue loss. Only in this latter case does
revenue  represent  a genuine problem  for trade liberalization.  Alternate broad-based  and
nondiscriminatory  revenue  sources should be sought, and trade reform sequenced  to
coincide  with the availability  of these alternate  revenue  sources.  Such altemative,  broad
based tax instruments  will be more efficient  (much  less distorting)  than trade taxes. For
many products,  such as alcohol,  tobacco and petroleum,  collection  of taxes on domestic
production  as well as imports  will have very low additional  administrative  costs, and will
reduce the incentives  to  develop inefficient import-substituting  firms. Even very poor
countries  such as Cambodia  have been  able  to introduce  broad-based  consumption  taxes
that reduce dependence on customs duties, and raise much-needed  revenues for
development  expenditures.
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Where labor market flexibility  is low, reforms  to improve  the operation  of labor markets
should  accompany  trade reforms  in order  to enhance  labor mobility.  For instance,  in Peru
in the 1980s, a trade reform failed to generate  any supply response  because  of severe
labor market rigidities.  Labor legislation  prohibited  firms to shed labor, close plants or
even change activities.  This led to many bankruptcies,  contributed  to foreign exchange
and financial  crises  and a failure  of the reform  (Nogues,  1991).
16The poor are often concentrated  in the informal  sector and reforms  which  increase
labor mobility in the formal sector can have a powerful  effect on reducing  poverty  when
combined  with trade liberalization  by opening  up additional  jobs in the formal sector  for
workers  previously  in the informal  sector.  This was  the case  in Panama,  for example,  see
World Bank (1999). The mutually  supportive  relations  between  trade, macroeconomic,
labor market and other policies  may then serve  to increase  the credibility  and payoffs  of
each.
Property rights for  land (and water) are also important in coping with needed
adjustments  or taking advantage  of export opportunities  that may be beneficial  to the
poor. For example,  Egypt  could produce  labor-intensive  crops (fruits and vegetables)  for
export to the EU, as is done in other Mediterranean  countries,  and the rural poor could
gain significantly  (Barres  and Valdes,  2000).  But because  of the lack of existence  of land
(and water)  markets,  Egypt  has not taken advantage  of this opportunity  and continues  to
grow traditional  crops.
4.4 Competition Policies
In manufacturing,  prices  paid  by poor consumers  are affected  by competitive  conditions  in
the country. It is possible  to increase  the competitiveness  of markets  for manufactured
goods in developing  countries,  that is, reduce  the markup  over the cost of production  by
lowering  external  barriers  to international  competition  as well as by reducing  government
imposed  barriers  to entry  against  domestic firms, Both are important  in providing  goods  to
poor consumers  with low monopoly  markups. In small countries  an open trade regime  is
especially  crucial, since there are fewer domestic  firms contesting  the market. In large
countries, administrative  and legal barriers against  domestic entry are relatively more
important than in small countries since there are more potential entrants blocked by
domestic  barriers  to entry  (Hoekman,  Kee  and Olarreaga,  2001).
Box  5. Rural  Poverty,  Cotton  and  Parastatals  in West  Africa
In most of Francophone  Africa, the national  parastatal  company  is the sole authorized
purchaser  and processor  of the farmers' seed cotton, and the sole seller of the joint
products  of ginning: cotton lint and cotton  seed. It also supplies  inputs to the farmers,
owns and operates  all the cotton  gins,  and provides  the transport  needed  to supply  the
inputs  to the farms,  the seed cotton  from  the farms  to the gins,  the lint to the ports  or to
local textile firms, and the seed to  local oil  mills or to  other markets. It  is also
responsible  for the sale of the lint, nearly  all of which  is exported.
Cotton  has proved  to be an economically  very efficient  crop and has made major
contributions  to the development  of rural areas,  exports,  poverty  alleviation  and growth.
The share of cotton  lint exports  increased  from about  4 percent  of world trade in cotton
in  the mid-1970s  to about 15  percent  in 1997.  However,  the absence  of any  competition
in the purchase  of seed cotton from farmers has implied  that farmers have been paid
prices  for their seed cotton  that tend to be far below  competitive  levels. In terms of lint
equivalent,  seed cotton prices in the Francophone  African countries have generally
been within  a range of  40 to 50 percent  of the export price of cotton  lint, compared  to
ratios  averaging  almost  90 percent  in India  and around  80 percent  in Zimbabwe.
Detailed  comparative  analyses  of costs show that only a small part of the low
Francophone  seed cotton prices can be explained  by higher transport  and operating
costs.  More  important  are high government  taxes (including  special  taxes on parastatal
profits and export  taxes on cotton lint), and implicit  taxes from sale of lint to domestic
textile firms at low prices and periodic costly management  mistakes and corrupt
17practices. Simulations suggest that  removing this taxation would generate large
percentage  increases  in seed cotton prices for farmers, varying from 45 percent in
Cameroon to 87 percent in Burkina Faso, expand output, and increase real farm
incomes.  Another problem  with parastatals  is that they typically impose pan-territorial
prices whereby  they pay the same price for all locations  (and times of the crop year).
These  subsidies  for transport  and storage  eliminated  any incentive  for private  provision
of these services, and resulted in production in socially inefficient locations. The
parastatal  monopoly  also prevented  the development  of private  credit  services.
Allowing private firms to  provide  the services of the parastatal  and permitting
farmers  to contract  with private  firms can be expected  to greatly improve  efficiency  and
have distributional  advantages  for poor farmers  in the long run. However,  it is important
to pay attention  to supporting  services  and markets  (such  as credit  and transportation)
during  the transition  to a market  based  system.  It is also possible  that the elimination  of
pan-territorial  pricing will have a negative  effect on poor farmers that are located in
isolated  regions.  As is frequently  the case, not all will necessarily  gain, pointing  to the
need  for a social  safety net.
Source: Pursell  (1998).
An  important sector in the context of trade reform is distribution.  If there are
barriers to  entry into distribution,  those who control this sector may be the primary
beneficiaries  of trade liberalization,  pocketing  much of what used to be collected  as tariff
revenue and  not passing the tariff cut on to  consumers. In  agriculture, parastatal
marketing  boards  often strongly  restrict competition  for the products  of poor farmers and
restrain their incomes (Box 5). Elimination  of the these boards, while paying attention
during the transition  that key ancillary  services like transportation  and credit that these
parastatals may be providing continue to  be supplied, should benefit the poor. But
competition  among  private  firms is also important.  Thus, exclusive  government  licenses  to
the private sector should also be avoided so that poor farmers do not have to  pay
excessive  prices for their inputs or receive monopsonistically  depressed  prices for their
outputs. The  prescription applies to  import monopolies and  exclusive distribution
arrangements.
FDI  is  an  important channel of  technology transfer  across national boundaries.
Multinational corporations account for  a  large share of  the  world's research and
development,  and more  than 80 percent  of royalty  payments  for technology  transfers  flow
from subsidiaries  of foreign companies  to their parent  firms (UNCTAD  1997). Econometric
evidence  tends  to support  the view that developing  countries  receiving  FDI perform  better
in terms of productivity  than their  counterparts  that are not FDI recipients.
What matters  from a poverty  reduction  perspective  is whether and to what extent
FDI has a positive  effect on the incomes  (employment)  of the poor and on the prices of
what they consume.  As far as employment  is concerned,  it is important  from a short run
viewpoint  that FDI involve labor-intensive  production  and result in the transfer of skills
through  training. Improvements  in communications,  transport  and information  technology,
together  with global  trade policy  reforms,  have made  it much  more  attractive  to companies
to engage in so-called  outsourcing  and processing  trade, where  the labor-intensive  parts
of production are located in developing  countries. In the 1970s such FDI focused in
particular  on textiles, more recently it has also included  the electronics  and auto parts
18sectors. Such investment  can be an important  catalyst for the creation of low skilled
employment-as exemplified  by Mexico  and South-East  Asian  economies.
Given  the importance  of low trade  costs  for such  activity,  policy  makers  should  avoid
offering trade protection  to foreign investors,  since this will attract the 'wrong' type of
investment  from an employment  creation  perspective  by depriving  the host country  of the
benefits  from participation  in international  production  and distribution  networks.  Protection
may also result  in losses  to the host  economy  by providing  rents  to foreign  investors  at the
expense of domestic consumers.  Lall and Streeten (1977:172-174)  studied some 90
foreign investments,  using a cost-benefit  methodology,  and found that more than 33%
reduced  national  income;  this was mainly  due to excessive  tariff protection  that allowed
high cost firms to produce  for the local market  at very high  prices,  even though  they could
have been imported much more cheaply. Encarnation  and Wells (1986) found that
between  25-45% of 50 projects studied  (depending  on analytical  assumptions)  reduced
national  income;  again  the main  culprit  was high  protection.
Intellectual  property  right  protection  can be important  in attracting  FDI  in sectors  that
rely  extensively  on patent  protection,  helping  to tilt the focus  of investment  projects  toward
manufacturing  and  away from distribution (Smarzynska,  2000). Intellectual property
protection is of direct importance  to the poor in developing countries, especially for
products and sectors that rely heavily on traditional knowledge  and culture, including
ethno-botanicals,  as well as activities  such  as writing  and performing  music.  The absence
of effective  protection  of intangible  assets  and intellectual  property  can have  very adverse
consequences  for the poor  that are  either producers  (e.g.,  handicrafts)  or the beneficiaries
of assets  that have been built up over time (e.g.,  traditional  designs,  plant varieties).  The
costs of intellectual  property rights  include the price  .increasing  effect of protection.  This
can have harmful  effects  on the poor by preventing  access  to drugs  and keeping  prices  far
above the  cost of  production.  As  discussed at  greater length by  Maskus (2001),
intellectual property right protection  must be complemented  by trade and competition
policy  instruments  that serve  to offset  the market  power  granted  to right  holders.
5  Sector Issues
In many developing  countries the manufacturing  sector has been most protected  as a
means of promoting  industrialization  and longer  term development.  A great deal of the
analysis regarding  trade reform in earlier sections  focuses implicitly  on reforms in that
sector.  However,  trade reforms  in agriculture  and services  provide  significant  opportunities
for employment  and incomes of the poor as well as reductions  in the costs of their
consumption.
5.1 The importance of agriculture
Because  the poor in developing  countries  are often  located  in rural  areas and employed  in
agriculture,  how trade reform affects  agriculture  will critically  affect its overall  impact on
poverty  alleviation.  Agricultural  importables  (mainly  staples)  are typically  protected,  while
agricultural  exportables  are often subject to export taxes. Agriculture  as a whole has
tended  to be taxed  indirectly  through  protection  of the manufacturing  sector,  overvaluation
of the real exchange  rate (Schiff  and Valdes, 1992,  2000),  and the operation  of marketing
boards or  similar parastatals (see above). Trade reform, which should cover both
agriculture  and manufacturing,  will therefore  typically  raise  agriculture's  domestic  terms of
trade and help the rural poor. The same is true for improved  macroeconomic  and fiscal
19policies  that result in a real exchange  rate that is closer to a sustainable  equilibrium.  In
other  words,  the rural poor will generally  benefit  from trade reform,  even  when it includes
agriculture.
Some  of the rural poor,  however,  may  lose.  Foremost  among  these  to consider  are
those who are employed  or produce  in sectors  that are highly  protected,  low-productivity
sectors. Examples include maize in Mexico, wheat in Morocco, and various import-
competing  crops  in many  developing  countries.  If the mobility  of these  rural poor  is limited,
then a reduction  in the tariffs in that sector  is likely  to hurt  that sub-group,  especially  in the
short term, as prices of their output fall. Over time these losses can be minimized  as
farmers  change  their output  mix and produce  more  of the crops  whose  prices  did not fall.
In a study on the Northeast  of Brazil,  one of the world's poorer  regions,  switching  to more
profitable  crops after trade liberalization  and devaluation  greatly reduced  negative real
income effects for small farmers (Lopez and Romano,  2000). Thus, trade liberalization
accompanied  by devaluation  (see  sub-section  4.1) can help dampen  the short-term  effect
on incomes  of the rural poor.
The ability  to shift to the production  of new products  (possibly  exportables  whose
price has risen) may depend importantly  on necessary  complementary  reforms.  Shifting
crops  may require  restructured  land  arrangements,  additional  capital  or access  to water. If
markets  for these  factors are poorly  developed,  farmers  may be unable  to take advantage
of new opportunities.  Thus, complementary  reforms  that focus on these markets  may be
necessary  to help poor farmers. Given that poor farmers may be hurt in the short run,
compensation  policies  such as improving  rural infrastructure,  research  and development,
and creating educational  opportunities  for  children are important. These options will
almost  always  be better  than protection,  as only if farmer's  returns  outside  agriculture  are
increased will poverty be reduced in the longer term. As far as trade reform itself is
concerned,  one option to  consider is to phase down tariffs in the vulnerable sector
gradually  following a pre-announced  schedule.  This is what was agreed  for the maize
sector in the NAFTA negotiations  between  the US and Mexico. Experience  shows that
unless  a schedule  of tariff reductions  is pre-announced  and actually  implemented  from the
start, reforms with long transition periods  (typically  over five years) lack credibility  and
provide  lobbyists  with  time to defeat  reform.
Fluctuating  world prices.  The liberalization  of a country's  agricultural  trade  policies
means  not only adjusting  to lower  or higher  general  price levels  prevailing  in international
markets,  but also  to the fluctuations  in world  prices  of agricultural  commodities.  In many
countries,  the impact  of these  fluctuations  on the domestic  economy  is a major motivation
for interventions  that de-link  domestic  and  international  markets.  Export  and import
controls,  government  controlled  parastatals  or marketing  boards,  and variable  tariffs  all
reduce  the size  of the international  market  in which  the commodity  is freely  traded  and
thus increase  the sensitivity  of international  prices  to exogenous  shocks  such  as bumper
harvests  and crop  failures.  For example,  international  trade  in rice is equivalent  to only 5
percent  of world production.  More  important,  the extent  to which  some  of the largest
producing  and consuming  countries  (e.g.  China,  India,  Indonesia,  and Brazil)  import  or
export  is subject  to discretionary  government  controls.  Policies  by these countries  aimed
at stabilizing  domestic  prices  can  have  a very large  impact  on prices in the narrow
international  market,  in  turn leading  to pressures  to maintain  or increase  border
interventions  elsewhere.  For this reason,  all countries  have a common  interest  in reducing
the instability  of world prices  by opening  their  domestic  markets  and removing  policies
which  de-link  domestic  from world  markets.
20Although  policies  to open domestic  markets,  especially  in large countries-both
developed  and developing 14--have  the potential  to substantially  reduce  the amplitude  of
fluctuations  in world  commodity  prices,  these  prices  are inherently  less  stable  than  the
world prices  of manufactured  goods  and the prices  of services." 5 In any case, most
individual  small countries  cannot  on their  own have any  perceptible  effect  on the level  or
volatility  of world commodity  prices,  and need  to find  the best  way  to live with  the price
swings  that they must  by and large  take as a given.  Consequently,  trade  liberalization  in
any  individual  country,  if fully implemented,  will often  (but by no means  always)  mean that
domestic  commodity  prices,  including  prices  at farm level,  will become  more  unstable. 1 6
Farmers  in many  countries  have repeatedly  shown  that they can adjust  rapidly  and
efficiently  to relative  price changes.  For there  to be  an overall  welfare  improvement  from
sheltering  farmers  from price  fluctuations,  the extra  income  of the groups  that benefit  from
interventions  must outweigh  the net economic  losses  consequent  on distorted  consumer
prices  and changes  in the government's  fiscal  position.  If all changes  in income,  including
government  income,  are  weighted  equally  in the decision-making  process,  the costs of
intervening  will always  exceed  the benefits.  It is generally  better  to target  the low income
groups  that are hurt with  actions  that increase  the ability  of farmers  and workers  to switch
between  crops,  complemented  with  welfare  and workfare  programs  until a reasonable
degree  of flexibility  and responsiveness  is achieved.
In considering  price  stabilizing  policies,  it important  to recognize  that once such
policies  are introduced,  it is very difficult  if not  impossible  to stop  the politically  powerful
from using  them to shift the average  price.  The commodity  marketing  boards  and
parastatal  monopolies  in developing  countries  discussed  previously  often  stabilized  prices
at very low levels  relative  to world  prices,  implying  heavy  taxation  of small  farmers  and
resource  transfers  to governments  and local processing  interests.  This may seriously
retard  the growth  of economically  efficient  rural  industries  and slow down  the contribution
that their expansion  could  make  to the alleviation  of rural poverty.  For import  substitutes,
the political  economy  forces  generally  point  in the opposite  direction,  and intervention
originally  justified  in the name  of price stabilization  (e.g. price band  schemes  introduced  in
Latin  America  during  the 1  990s)  very often  become  de facto price support  schemes  that
develop  a momentum  of their own.
OECD  intervention. Export  subsidies  on products  such as meat, dairy products
and grains, depress  prices on world markets,  and thus also on the domestic markets  of
developing  countries.  Some  countries  such as Japan maintain  very high barriers  against
imports  of wheat, rice and other agricultural  commodities.  As mentioned,  such policies
"4 For  example,  if the markets  for rice,  wheat,  sugar,  milk  products,  sugar  and  cotton  were  open  in
China  and India,  that would  greatly  expand  the size  of the world  market  for these  products  and
reduce  the  impact  of various  exogenous  shocks  (Tyers  and  Anderson,  1992).
15  Abstracting  from fragmented  world markets,  commodity  price instability  is associated  with
inelastic  demand,  lags  in  supply  adjustments  due  to seasonal  production,  weather  conditions  etc.
16 Prices  in domestic  commodity  markets  (e.g.  for sorghum  and  maize  in  inland  areas  of Africa  and
South  Asia)  that are disconnected  from world  markets  by a combination  of high domestic  and
marketing  costs  and/or  restrictive  trade  policies,  may  fluctuate  more  than  world  prices  both  within
and across  seasons.  Linking  them  to world markets  by opening  imports  could increase  price
stability,  e.g.,  by  cutting  off  price  peaks  resulting  from  crop  failures.  The  use  of measures  to control
imports  and  exports  in  ways  that  do not  adjust  flexibly  to domestic  market  conditions  may  also  lead
to higher  domestic  price  instability  than in world  markets,  or worse  still, to costly  and wasteful
accumulations  of excess  stocks  held  by  government  marketing  organizations.  A significant  portion
of such  stocks  often  are  lost  to pests  and  weather.
21contribute to  world market price instability, constrain exports and  increase import
competition.  While most of the poorest developing  countries produce  temperate  zone-
products  such as fruits, nuts and vegetables  that do not compete  with subsidized  and
protected  meat, milk and grains,  for some  low-income  countries  (e.g., meat production  in
Mali or Burkina Faso), and, of course,  for middle  income  developing  countries  such as
Argentina or Brazil, EU export subsidies are a  major factor constraining  agricultural
exports.
What is the appropriate  response  to such foreign policies? Insofar  as prices are
forced downward, consumers  tend to  gain. The impact of the policies on producers
depends  on whether  farmers  compete  with subsidized  imports,  whether  the subsidies  vary
significantly  over time, whether  farmers are on average  net buyers or net sellers of the
commodities  concemed,  the relative  importance  of subsistence  farming,  and the relative
sizes of the rural and urban poor population.  If there is no domestic production  of the
agricultural  products  concerned,  there  is no need  for intervention,  as subsidized  prices  are
beneficial  to consumers.  Matters  are more complex  in instances  where  there is domestic
production  of the commodities  concerned.  It is important  to note  that households  that are
net buyers of the products will gain from subsidies,  while subsistence  farmers will be
unaffected.  The urban  poor will generally  gain insofar  as the subsidies  lower  prices.  Thus,
what matters from a policy point of view is whether  the gains to the non-rural  poor are
larger  than the losses incurred  by rural households  that are net sellers. To answer  this
question  requires  collecting  information  on the number  of households  that are engaged  in
subsistence  production,  those  that are net buyers,  and those  that are net sellers.  Another
important  factor concerns  the distribution  of the labor  force engaged  in production  in farms
that are net sellers.  Those  that own  the land  may lose from lower  prices,  but the extent of
such losses are bounded  (as they may shift to subsistence  farming).  While this can imply
a severe reduction  in real incomes,  landless  laborers  working  for net sellers confront  the
most severe potential  loss in that they may lose their source of income  without having
subsistence  farming  to fall back  on.
In cases  of agricultural  sectors  with significant  numbers  of households  that are net
sellers  of commodities  that are subsidized  by OECD  countries,  it is sometimes  argued  that
higher  tariffs on agricultural  imports  are appropriate.  This increases  the domestic price,
thus helping to  offset the effect of the subsidy and allowing domestic producers to
compete.  This is akin to 'countervailing'  the effect  of foreign policies.  From the viewpoint
of efficiency,  when  subsidies  are permanent,  such  a policy  is not desirable  as it moves  the
structure  of protection  away  from uniformity,  and distorts  producer  and consumer  choices.
Given the long-lasting  nature of intervention  by high-income  countries, countries  should
regard  this as part of the external  environment.  The implication  is that importing  country
governments  should not impose countervailing  tariffs. 17 However, with the Uruguay
Round, multilateral disciplines were strengthened,  and it  is  clear that there will  be
significant  pressure  on the EU and other high-income  countries  to substantially  reduce
protection  and gradually  eliminate  export  subsidies  in the coming  decade.  Thus, over  time
17 A key  issue  is whether  the export  subsidies  are permanent  or transitory.  If the subsidies  are
permanent,  it will  be  in the  country's  interest  to ignore  the subsidy  for policy  purposes  because  the
economic  costs  of protection  to the economy  outweigh  the benefits  to domestic  producers.  If the
foreign  subsidy  is permanent,  then  the national  interest  is unaffected  by whether  the price  is low
because  of foreign  comparative  advantage  or export  subsidies.  If the  subsidies  are  transitory  (and
there  are  capital  market  or other  imperfections),  there  is a case  for temporary  protection  for those
tariff lines subject  to competition  from subsidized  exports  so that adjustment  costs can be
minimized-see below.
22the  external environment is likely to  become less distorted. Insofar as developing
countries currently maintain  above average  tariffs on the relevant agricultural  imports,
there is then a potential  case  not to reduce  these  as much  or as rapidly  as tariffs  on other
products  as part of an overall  trade policy  reform." 8 The reason  is that liberalization  could
give rise to inefficient  reallocation  of resources  if there are adjustment  costs associated
with the downsizing  of agricultural  production  following  liberalization  and the subsequent
expansion  as the export  subsidies  and OECD  protection  are  reduced.
In practice, however,  OECD liberalization  can be expected  to take a long time,
witness  efforts  to do so over  the past  30 years.  Moreover,  it will be impossible  to precisely
countervail  the impact  of foreign  policies  on world  prices;  the information  requirements  for
such  a policy  are substantial.  Account  should  also be  taken  of the risk that protection  may
become permanent  even if the foreign protection  and export subsidies  come off, and,
more  fundamentally,  that trade  intervention  is a second  best approach  to dealing  with the
problem. The best policy is to push for the phase-out  of export subsidies and OECD
protection  of agriculture  in the WTO context,  and ensure  that any assistance  provided  to
domestic farmers is  designed primarily to  target domestic poverty concerns. More
generally,  whether  or not foreign  countries  intervene  in agricultural  markets  should  not be
the focus of  policy. Instead, the focus should be on determining how large is  the
population  that may lose from trade liberalization  in the short run, that is, net sellers of
protected  commodities.
While trade policy is not the appropriate  long-term  instrument  through  which to
pursue  rural poverty  reduction  objectives,  it can  play a role in three situations.  The first is
to deal with temporary import surges that have a significant  negative impact on the
livelihood of  poor farmers. In such cases a  special safeguard mechanism  can be
considered, under which temporary protection can be sought if  domestic prices of
products  that are of importance  to the poor in terms of production  and employment  fall
significantly  in a short period  of time due to imports.  Whether  these  are subsidized  does
not matter;  what matters  is that there  is a serious  detrimental  impact  on poor  farmers.  The
general  design  of any such  safeguard  mechanism  should  conform  to the principles  set out
in section 3.3 above. The second situation  is if the overall policy regime discriminates
against agriculture,  i.e., policy favors industrial  production  and/or urban consumers  of
food.  While this can be used as an argument  in favor of higher  protection  for poor farmers
in low-income  countries,-the  appropriate  policy is instead  lowering  protection  for industry
and offsetting any prevailing  policy bias against the rural poor. In contexts  where this
cannot  be achieved,  or where  it is pursued  gradually,  there  may be a case  for maintaining
higher  rates of protection  on agricultural  commodities  on second-best  grounds.  Third, in
situations  where complementary  policies  (safety nets) are inadequate  and a significant
number  of the poor are engaged  in production  of commodities  that are sold domestically,
agricultural  trade policy reform  should  be gradual,  involving  a pre-announced  schedule  of
tariff reductions.
Potential  negative  impacts  of reform  in this sector  on net sellers  can be attenuated
by accompanying  the trade reform with a devaluation  and implementing  complementary
reforms  in markets  for land, credit  and water  to enable farmers  to take advantage  of the
new opportunities,  adjust  to changed  incentives  and benefit  from the reform.  Govemment
has an important role to play in fostering agricultural  and rural development,  including
18 If agriculture  import  barriers  currently  are  not  higher  than  for manufactures,  there  is no rationale
for raising  them  given  that  adjustment  will  already  have  taken  place.
23through  encouraging absorption of  new  technologies, education  and  providing
infrastructure.  Such complementary  policies are crucial in that they can be critical in
addressing  the needs  of the rural poor.  In all cases  there  is a need  for careful  analysis  of
the prevailing  situation  before reforms  are pursued.  This should  focus on identifying  the
balance between  rural net buyers,  rural net sellers,  and the urban poor, as well as the
importance  of subsistence  farming.
A final remark.  For the least  developed  countries,  a key challenge  is meeting  the
standards and  rule of  origin requirements  imposed under preferential arrangements
granting  duty-free  access.  By allowing  goods  produced  in these  countries  to receive  high
prices in major export  markets,  but goods  to be imported  at world prices,  they allow the
poorest countries  a double benefit. Preferential  access  provides  a positive  incentive  to
produce  these products  for sale in the highly  protected  markets  of the OECD countries
that grant such access. In effect, the preferential  access provides protection to LDC
producers in the developed  country markets that offer preferential  access. As these
markets are both vastly larger than their own, and offer very inflated prices due to
protection,  this may  allow  farmers  in LDCs  to increase  their  incornes  by producing  more  of
these  products  for export. 19
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Services-which  include activities such as transport of  goods and people, financial
services (banking, insurance) telecommunications,  distribution, tourism (hotels and
restaurants),  construction,  as well as education  and health care, account for a rising
portion of GDP, in even in the lowest-income  countries.  The importance  of an efficient
service  sector  goes beyond  the contribution  of the services  sector itself to the balance  of
payments,  because  the efficiency  of many service sectors is a key determinant  of the
competitiveness  of firms. Key sectors that influence  the ability of firms to participate  in
world trade are telecommunications,  transportation,  financial  services  and other  business
services  such  as accounting  and legal  services.
The gains  from eliminating  barriers  to competition  in the various  business  services
can be very large and fundamentally  effect the country's comparative  advantage and
pattern of trade (Markusen,  Rutherford  and Tarr, 2000). As nations reduce barriers to
trade in goods, it  has become apparent  that in many countries, inefficient business
services sectors have become the principal barrier to  effective integration in world
markets. Inefficient  provision of trade-support  services acts as a tax on exporters of
merchandise  goods and ultimately  on growth  and poverty  reduction.  Establishing  policies
that encourage  competitive  and efficient  services sectors,  such as allowing  entry where
possible  and encouraging  foreign direct investment  should  therefore be a major element
of global integration  and poverty  reduction  strategies.  In particular,  projects  that address
restructuring  and reform of service sectors should  take into account  the importance  of
establishing  a regulatory  environment  that is contestable.
Liberalization  of services  sectors  means  reduction  or elimination  of barriers,  where
barriers tend to take the form of prohibitions,  quantitative  restrictions and regulations
(UNCTAD  and World Bank, 1994). For example,  such restrictions  may prohibit foreign
t9 Farmers  in middle  income  countries  may  face  different  incentives,  as they  will suffer  a decline  in demand  for
their  products  in the EU  because  of preferential  access  provided  only  to the LDCs.
24direct investment  in certain  sectors,  limit  the share of ownership  of foreign firms in these
sectors, limit the number  of expatriates  that can be employed,  or restrict the amount of
imports of a particular  service. Frequently  the restrictions  apply to both domestic and
foreign  suppliers  and result  in public  sector  monopolies  in the provision  of services,  e.g. in
air and maritime transport (inclusive port services), telecommunications,  or  financial
services.  In many such cases, elimination  of public sector monopolies  may need to be
accompanied  with opening  up of service  markets  to foreign  direct  investment  (e.g.  through
relaxing of provisions  regarding  the right of establishment  of foreign firms) because  it is
the foreign providers  that may be able to provide  significant  improvements  in efficiency
and cost reductions.
There is evidence  of a positive  relationship  between  private competitive  provision
of telecommunication  services  and the availability  of telephone  lines at affordable  rates.
This is especially  true in countries  where initial conditions  are characterized  by a low
teledensity  or service  rationing  (long  waiting  lists  for obtaining  connections).  Simply letting
the market  work can substantially  improve  access  in an environment  where services  have
been  traditionally  provided  by inefficient  public  monopolies-even in the poorest  countries
and among  low income  consumers.
For many intemationally  traded goods, the cost of international  transportation  is
higher  than the applicable  tariff on imports.  For a small economy  confronting  given world
prices  of traded goods, higher  transport  costs reduce  export prices and increases  prices
of delivered imports. Hence, exporting  industries  with higher transport  costs must pay
lower wages  or accept  lower returns  on capital.  Amjadi  and Yeats (1995)  find that freight
rates for Sub-Saharan  African countries  often are considerably  higher than on similar
goods originating  in other countries  and thus have contributed  to the region's  poor trade
performance  over the last decades.  High transportation  costs are due in part to anti-
competitive  policies,  such  as cargo reservation  schemes  maintained  by a large number  of
African  countries  and international  shipping  cartels  and legislated  monopoly  providers  in
both industrialized  and developing countries (Francois and Wooton, 2001; Fink and
Mattoo,  2001).
Box  6. Liberalizing  Trade  in Transport  Services
Shipping deregulation  in Chile started in 1979 and aimed at dismantling  a system
based  on cargo reservation  protection  for the national  fleet. The core  of the reform  was
eliminating  restrictions  on foreign  shipping  companies  to supply international  transport
services.  In addition,  monopoly  rights  in cargo loading  operations  in Chilean  seaports
were eliminated,  allowing  the entry of new private  operators  and the development  of a
competitive  market  for cargo handling  services.  Moreover,  the government  tripled  port
capacity  by obtaining  labor  flexibility.  It did this by paying  the union  for the right  to use
workers not under union  contract  which allowed  it to move  from a union-constrained
eight hour day to 24 hour cargo handling.  This led to a significant  cost reduction  and
an increase in exports, particularly the time-sensitive  agricultural exports that are
intensive in rural labor. Demand increased especially  for female labor involved in
picking,  sorting,  selecting  and packing  of fruits and vegetables
The new status quo proved  beneficial  during  the 1981-82  economic  crisis, as
Chile's  exporters  had "untrammeled  access  to the international  shipping  markets"  and
were able to supply more price-competitive  products.  Chilean  fruit exporters  entered
into long-term contracts with international  shipping enterprises to  ensure regular
service,  guaranteeing rapid  transit  and  certain  timing  of  delivery,  essential
requirements  on  the highly  competitive  export  fruit market.
25Denial of  access to foreign-owned  transport companies  to domestic inland
routes can also be important in cutting off a region to international  trade.  China
provides an example: exporters  from inner China typically send goods to ports in a
break-bulk  form by truck or railway,  where the goods are containerized  and shipped.
Multinational  companies,  however,  require  access  to container  transport  from door-to-
door. This  multimodal transport requirement cannot be  met  given low  inland
penetration  of containers,  so that most export  industries  locate  on the coast and often
import  raw materials  and intermediates  from abroad  rather  than source  from mainland
China. Lack of competition  was a major factor:  two state-owned  companies  (SOEs)
had around  80% of the market  for freight  forwarding  and shipping  agencies.  Although
the government  allows  major  foreign  shipping  lines  to establish  freight  forwarding  arms
in China, they may only handle parent companies'  products.  Restrictions  on shipping
agencies  are even more  sweeping:  government  rules bar foreign  or joint venture  from
entering  the shipping  market,  limiting  it solely  to SOEs.
Source: Bennathan(1989)  and  World  Bank  (1996).
The case of Zimbabwe's  vegetable  exports illustrates  the enormous  possibilities
when transport and related services are efficient. In the early 1990s, farmers near the
capital have been supplying fresh vegetables  to the London market by picking them,
immediately  trucking  them to the airport,  and  flying them ovemight  to London  where they
are on the shelves ready for sale in the morning.  This requires  cheap and reliable air
transport  and modern  telecommunications  because  the shipments  are delivered  to order
(Krugman, 1998).  In the Maghreb,  Amiot and Salama  (1996) estimate  that eliminating
restrictions on ship registry in Morocco could lead to  25% savings on the maritime
transport  costs for clothing  and footwear.  All Algerian  and Moroccan  ports, as well as the
main ports in Tunisia, are operated by inefficient government-owned  cargo-handling
companies,  which charge 30% in excess  of the rates that would be quoted by a private
independent  operator. Licenses  required by exporters and importers  to charter vessels
also create  barriers  to international  trade,  since permission  to charter  is granted  only if the
national shipping line withdraws.  This is estimated  to cost an additional  20% over the
usual  international  freight  rates.
Services  reform  and the poor.  Although  the poor spend less of their income  on
services than the non-poor,  significant  benefits can accrue to the poor from increased
efficiency of services markets. Services such as transport, education,  and access to
communications  and finance are vital determinants  of the ability of the poor to find
employment  and market their production.  The incomes of the rural poor are strongly
dependent  on marketing  and transportation  costs, and on the efficiency  of transportation
networks.  High  transport  or marketing  costs  lower  the prices  received  by poor farmers  and
raise the prices of food to poor consumers.  Competition  in these  sectors  is very important
to  poverty reduction, as are resources devoted to  "trade facilitation"  to  improve the
efficiency  of service  networks  and reduce  corruption  and related  transactions  costs.
Recent research based on household  surveys  found that farmers' access to a
public  telephone  is positively  related  to the price they receive  in district markets  for their
farm output.  Decreasing  the distance  to a telephone  by 10 percent  would lead to a 1.6
percent  increase in  local  prices  (Larson, 2000).  In  Bangladesh villages, women
entrepreneurs  provide  pay phone  services at a profit, using mobile  cellular technology.
Even though rural villagers cannot afford a  phone individually,  they can afford one
collectively  (Lawson  and Meyenn,  2000).  A key aspect of services  liberalization  is that it
26often involves  the movement  of factors of production  because  the services concerned
cannot  be traded.  Given  the structure  of factor prices  in poor countries,  an inflow  of capital
through FDI would tend to  be to  the advantage of  the unskilled poor-increasing
employment  opportunities  and wages.
Liberalization  of services  and the resultant  competition  are likely to lead to lower
prices, greater availability  and improved  quality of services.  In so far as the poor are
consumers  of these  services,  they are likely  to benefit.  But  there is a twist.  Frequently,  the
prices pre-liberalization  are not determined  by the market  but set administratively,  and are
kept artificially  low  for low income  end-users.  Thus, rural borrowers  may pay  lower  interest
rates than urban  borrowers,  and prices of local  telephone  calls and public  transport  may
be kept  lower  than  the cost of provision.  This  structure  of prices  is often sustained  through
cross-subsidization  within public monopolies  or through government  financial support.
New entrants may focus on the most profitable  market segments  ("cream-skimming"),
such as urban areas, where the cost or service provision may be lower and incomes
higher. Privatization  could mean the end of government  support.  The result is that even
though the sector becomes  more efficient  and average  prices  decline,  the prices  for low
income  households  may  actually  increase  and/or  availability  decline. 20
Universal service or access goals are not contradictory  with liberalization  of
service markets.  The handicap  of providing  services  to low income households  can in
principle  also be imposed  on new entrants  in a non-discriminatory  way. Thus, universal
service obligations  can be part of the license conditions  for  new entrants into fixed
network telephony and transport. But recourse  to fiscal instruments  has proved more
successful than direct regulation-for  example, through universal service funds  or
subsidies  for providing  services  in rural  areas.  Another  effective  mechanism  is to fund the
consumer  rather  than the provider  through  vouchers,  as has been the case  for education
and energy  services  in a number  of countries  (Mattoo,  2001).
Assessing  services policy and performance.  A careful evaluation  of services
trade policy requires analysis of the conditions  of competition  in a  particular sector,
notably restrictions  on entry; ownership  limitations,  private and foreign; and regulation,
especially elements designed to  achieve pro-poor outcomes in competitive  markets.
Relevant  questions  for policy-makers  include:  How  much  greater  would the benefits  be if
privatization were accompanied  by the introduction  of  competition?  Are there good
reasons  to limit  entry by policy?  What institutional  features  promote  the effectiveness  of a
sector regulator?  What should  the regulator  regulate?  What are  the costs and benefits  of
restrictions  on  foreign  ownership?
In  many countries, an assessment of policy and performance  in services is
frustrated by a dearth of data. Main performance  indicators  include price and quality
variables and measures of  access and availability  of  services to  the poor. Detailed
templates  for an assessment  of policy  and performance  in services  in a particular  country
have recently  been  developed  by the World Bank  for three key services  sectors. 2"  These
can  be used  to benchmark  countries  against  international  experience.
20 In the case  of agricultural  exportables,  increased  domestic  transport  efficiency  to the port  will
typically  raise inland  farmgate  prices.  This could  worsen  the welfare  of low income  consumers  of
that  product  in inland  areas.  .
21  They  cover  telecommunications,  air  and  maritime  transport,  and  financial  services  and  are available  at
http:./wwwl  .worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/services.html.
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One of the most important  complementary  policies  for the poor  is an efficient  social  safety
net. It is highly recommended  that a program  to establish  a social safety net be in place
independent  of the needs related  to trade liberalization.  The best outcomes  for the poor
can be expected  when as a result  of the overall  reform  process,  of which  trade is a part,
growth  accelerates  in the economy  as a whole.  Especially  in  the short run, however,  there
are bound  to be some  effects  on some  groups  of poor who may  be incapable  of sustaining
even short periods  with adverse adjustment  costs. One needs to be especially  careful
regarding the effects of any reform on the poor, as they are least able to bear risks
because  they do not have  the savings.
An  important issue that confronts all trade policy reforms then relates to  the
hardship  faced by poor workers  in import  competing  activities  who lose income  following
import  liberalization.  The policy  choices  broadly  defined  are: employ  general  social  safety
nets; establish  safety nets targeted  to those who are harmed  by the trade reform; and
selective  limitation  of the reforms  or intervention  in markets  for the purpose  of limiting  the
impact  of market  reforms  on the poor.
One type of market intervention  is based on the view that opening up to world
markets  will increase  risk because  world markets  are typically  unstable.  However,  poor
countries  are also subject  to large  domestic  shocks  and it is unclear  whether  openness  to
trade increases  risk. Government  attempts  to reduce  the risk of trade openness  through
marketing  boards  and similar  institutions  aimed  to cushion  the impact  of international  price
fluctuations on producers,  especially  the poor, have often been counterproductive.  As
discussed  above, many of these agencies  have imposed  significant  taxes on the poor.
Experience  with these institutions  reveals  the risks  for the poor of efforts  by governments
to limit the scope of market reforms,  even when these limitations  are intended  for their
benefit. A  fundamental problem in using government interventions  that  limit market
reforms ostensibly  for the benefit of the poor is that these interventions  are subject to
political lobbying.  The poor typically  lack political power, so that political intervention  in
market processes  will typically result in outcomes  that are even worse for the poor (see
above). A variety of efforts are underway  in many countries  to replace parastatals  and
similar bodies with more efficient, private  sector entities. 22 In low-income  countries  such
alternatives  may not be a viable  option,  however.  As noted  earlier,  complementary  actions
may be called,  such as improving  and reducing  the cost of education  to poor households.
Specialized  safety nets linked to trade reform have a spotty history. In practice
difficult to distinguish  workers who are harmed  due to trade reform  from those who are
harmed due to normal turnover  or displacement  in an economy.  The United States has
been providing  trade adjustment  assistance  (TAA)  to workers displaced  by international
trade since 1962 (not linked to  poverty). The US program provides both monetary
compensation  (called  Trade Readjustment  Allowances,  TRA) and retraining.  In the early
years of the program,  it was found that income  support  was typically  provided  to workers
who were not permanently  separated  from their employers,  i.e.,  the program  was not well
targeted (Corson  and Nicholson,  1981).  However,  changes  in the design  and monitoring
22  For example,  the International  Task Force  on Commodity  Risk Management  seeks to establish  market-
based price insurance  schemes  that would reduce the price risk farmers (especially  the poor) have to
shoulder  in exporting  cash  crops.
28of the program  in 1982  and 1988  have resulted  in better  targeting  (Decker  and Corson,
1995).
The results  of retraining  programs  appear  to be mixed.  When retraining  is required,
as in the U.S., it may be ineffective.  More generally,  the effectiveness  of  retraining
programs  tends to increase if  they are demand driven, so, for  example, subsidized
apprenticeships  in the private  sector  may work  better than government  provided  training
23 programs. An alternate  approach  to requiring  retraining  is to require  the participation  in a
job search program.  This appears  to increase  the likelihood  of employment  and reduce
unemployment  benefits among recipients  (Johnson  and Klepinger, 1991; Decker and
Corson,  1995).
Fundamentally,  it is difficult  to morally  justify safety net programs  to poor people
who are harmed  due to trade  reform  and deny  assistance  to other  poor people  who suffer
equivalent  harm from fluctuations  such as technological  displacement  or price changes
due to domestic  demand  shifts.  Consequently,  it is best  to employ  general,  country-wide,
safety nets to deal with problems  linked to trade reform, rather  than establish  special
safety net programs  for trade related  problems.  As the main need for the poor during a
difficult  transition  period  is likely  to be food, one approach  is a time limited  food subsidy
and distribution  program.  Targeting  a food subsidy,  however,  is difficult  and where it has
been done, it has been subject  to abuse.  24  An alternative  is an untargeted  subsidy  on
inferior  goods, as has been pursued  in Egypt  (Adams,  2000), although  Egypt's program
has  been  permanent,  not temporary.
Direct income support tends to be the most efficient  type of social safety net,
provided  it can be administratively  arranged.  A problem  is that it is very hard to identify
who actually  needs the money and even harder  to get it to all those who need it. One
approach,  which  was employed  successfully  in Jordan,  is to provide  a money  payment  to
all households  initially. The program  was subsequently  narrowed  to  middle and low-
income  families  and finally,  to only low-income  families.  Because  distinguishing  the poor
from the non-poor  may be difficult,  workfare  programs  may be more  generally  applicable,
and have been proven effective under certain circumstances  (Ravallion, 1999), as
individuals  can self-identify  for these programs.  The chapter  in this Sourcebook  on social
protection  provides  more  guidance  on safety  nets.
In general,  as trade reforms are undertaken,  the groups of poor which may be
adversely  affected  need  to be identified  as accurately  as possible  and provisions  should
be made  for their enrollment  in whatever  safety  net programs  are available  for as long as
necessary.  Clearly  safety  nets  are needed  to support  the poor  during  a period  of transition
which may vary in duration  and severity  depending  on their age, skills,  mobility  and other
similar  factors.  If there are no general safety nets  available,  they should  be installed,  not
because trade reform demands them,  but because they  should be  an  essential
component  of a sustainable  poverty  reduction  strategy.  A practical  problem  is that some
poor countries  may not be able to afford a full-fledged  safety  net. For the design of trade
policy  reform  this strengthens  the need both  for up front analysis  of where  the poor are
located  in terms  of production  (income)  and consumption,  assessing  which  groups  may be
23  O'Leary  (1995)  discusses  the measurement  of the effectiveness  of labor  market  programs  in Hungary  and
Poland.
24  Subsidies  to consumption  of essential  commodities  will often result  in a transfer  of income  to the middle
and upper  classes  since  the  wealthy  buy more  in absolute  amounts  of essential  commodities.
29seriously  detrimentally  affected,  and determining  what types of complementary  reforms
would  best offset  these  potential  losses.
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As  discussed above and in the Appendix, in tracing through the  impact of  trade
liberalization  on the poor, it is important  to consider  both  the pattern  of expenditures  and
sources  of incomes  of the poor.  However,  what  matters  most in the short  run is the impact
on incomes.  The effect  of trade  reform  on poverty  in the longer  term hinges  very much  on
the growth process-which in turn will depend  on a variety  of complementary  policies  and
institutions.  In low income  countries,  the key complementary  policies/institutions  that need
to be analyzed  fall into the following major areas: (a) macro-economic,  and especially
exchange  rate policy; (b) the operation  of the market  for labor, since the poor are often
concentrated  in the informal  sector;  (c) the operation  of the markets  for agriculture-which
is both a major source of income and accounts  for a large portion of the household
expenditures  of the poor; (d) access  of the poor to trade related  services-for  example,
credit,  marketing,  transportation;  and (e) access  to safety nets. There  are of course other
issues,  such as governance,  which are important  here as well as in other reform  efforts.
Tools are being  developed  by the World Bank  that can assist policymakers  in identifying
the impact of trade liberalization  on the poor. 26 What follows provides  a "checklist"  of
questions  and issues  that should  be considered  in  the design  and pursuit  of trade  reform.
The basic  elements  of a good  trade policy  regime  involve  predictability,  transparency,  and
uniformity.  The following bullets describe  in a nutshell  what constitutes  a liberal trade
policy regime. These provide a benchmark  against  which to judge the prevailing  trade
regime  and provide  guidance  for the direction  of reforms.
*  No licensing,  or other  approvals,  except  for health,  safety  and environmental  reasons,
and automatic  licensing  used  for statistical  purposes;  no other  QRs.
*  Low and uniform  tariffs. If the tariff is not uniform,  it should  have little  dispersion,  with
only  a small  number  of bands.  A few sectors  with  very high tariffs  should  be especially
avoided.
*  If tariffs are important  for revenue  generation,  uniformity  implies  that the overall  level
of the tariff should be such as to generate  the revenue required. However,  some
products-such as alcohol and tobacco  products-may be subjected  to high duties  to
raise  revenue, as  long  as  equivalent excise taxes are  imposed on  domestic
production.
*  An efficient customs clearance process with little red tape, that ensures  tariff-free
access  to intermediate  imports  for exporters.
*  Only  one  instrument of  contingent protection-a  safeguard provision. No  anti-
dumping.
25  A more  detailed  presentation  of these  guidelines  may  be found  in Michalopoulos  (2001).
26  For a synthesis  of available  methods  see the proceedings  from a October  2000  conference  "Poverty  and
the Intemational  Economy",  available  at: http:I/wwwl.worldbank.orglwbiep/trade/povertyconf.html.  Tools will
be posted  on this  site  as they become  available.
30*  Contestable  service markets-measures  to ensure competition  prevails,  there is no
discrimination  against foreign suppliers that seek to  establish a presence in the
market,  and  that appropriate  regulation  is in place.
7.3 Is Trade Reform Needed?
A number of questions  are relevant  in determining  whether trade reform should be a
priority  and whether  this will benefit  the majority  of the poor:
*  What is the impact  of status  quo trade policies  on the poor? It is important  to
determine  the effect on the poor of the existing pattern  of protection/subsidization.
Such effects  may be positive  or negative,  and affect  particular  products  consumed  by
the poor or the incomes  of a significant  number  of the poor,  whether  country-wide  or in
a  particular region. Taxes or  supports for  important food staples or  inputs to
agriculture,  in particular,  should  be identified  and their incidence  examined.  In those
cases where  the structure  of protection  is not beneficial  to the poor there is a prima
facie case  for reform.  In those  cases  where  some  of the poor benefit,  an assessment
should be made of the relative  magnitude  of the potential  losses  and the economy-
wide gains  from reform.
*  Are there non-tariff barriers  for  reasons other than for health, safety and the
environment?  To the extent  that significant  non- tariff barriers  are present,  there is
again  a prima  facie case of a need  for reform-starting with conversion  to tariffs.  This
reform is likely to benefit the poor more than the non-poor  since license recipients
typically  collect  rents, are  unlikely  to be poor (almost  by definition)  and  the competition
for licenses  wastes  resources  that can  be used  productively.
i  What is the average tariff and how dispersed  is it? The more dispersion,  the
greater  the difference  in treatment  of different  sectors  and segments  of society  is likely
to  be, and the  greater the urgency for  reform. Dispersion often generated by
exemptions  and tariff escalation  will lead to high effective  rates of protection  and is
likely  to entail  significant  inefficiencies.
*  Is there discrimination  against agriculture? The overall policy stance affecting
agriculture  should  be determined,  starting  with an assessment  of the 'effective'  rate of
protection  for this sector compared  to manufacturing-see  Schiff and Valdes (1992)
for a description  of a methodology  to do  this. The importance  of agriculture  lies in the
fact that the rural poor are likely  to account  for a large  share  of the poor.
*  How well do critical service markets function? Do the poor have access to
important  ancillary  services  such  as  transport?  Do  policies  discriminate  against  foreign
suppliers  and lead  to high  cost,  low quality  domestic  supply?  Is entry  possible  in labor-
intensive  sectors  such as tourism  or back-office  services?  Does  competition  prevail  in
key 'backbone'  sectors  such  as transport,  finance  and communications?  Is appropriate
pro-competitive  regulation  in place?
*  How efficient  is customs?  How long does it take to clear a container  or air freight
shipment?  How does  this compare  to neighboring  countries  and  to best practice?  How
large are 'unofficial'  trade facilitation  payments?  Is there a functioning  drawback  and
temporary  admission  mechanism?
7.4 Getting There
The overall analysis of the trade regime should yield a preliminary  judgment on the
desirability  of trade  reform.  Analysis  of both  the impact  of the status  quo policy  set and the
likely  effect  of alternative  reforms  on the poor  is important.  The tools  to undertake  such an
31analysis  can be constructed  for most  economies;  the basic  requirements  include  detailed
data on imports and exports,  the trade barriers  that apply to those goods, household
survey information  on the consumption  pattem of the poor and the sources of their
income,  and data on the basic structure  of the economy  (ideally  an input-output  table or
social accounting  matrix). The basic elements  of a framework  for the analysis  that is
required  is laid out in the Appendix-practical  tools  to undertake  such  analyses  are being
developed  by the World Bank and will be posed on www.worldbank.ora/trade  as they
become  available. 27
This  judgment  should  be  then reviewed  in  the light  of the potential  short-term  effects  of
trade reform  on the poor. If there  are possible  negative  effects,  it is important  to identify
the relevant products and sectors early on, in order to help design arrangements  for
dealing with adverse impacts of  the  reform and develop strategies for  developing
consensus  in  their support.
Strong government  commitment  to the reform is critical. The govemment  should
attempt  to explain  the desirability  for reform  and obtain  the support  from some parts of
civil society. Obtaining  a broad consensus  may be a difficult task. The benefits from
reform are likely to be dispersed,  uncertain  and spread  over time; whereas  the private
costs of sectors  that will be facing increased  competition  from imports  will be obvious,
near  term and likely  to be concentrated  in powerful  political  groups.
It might  appear  tempting  to design  a pro-poor  trade reform  by identifying  sectors  that
are important  to the poor-either  on the consumption  side or the income side-and
singling  out these sectors  for differentiated  cuts in protection.  If, for instance,  many  poor
people  produce  maize,  as in Mexico,  it might  seem  sensible  to exclude  this product  from a
tariff reduction.  There are at least  two problems  with this approach.  One is fundamental
and the other  relates  to political  economy. The  fundamental  problem  is that trade  policy  is
a single  instrument,  and a fundamental  principle  of economic  policy  formulation  is that a
single  instrument  can not be expected  to address  multiple  targets.  The political  economy
problem is that, once a highly differentiated  trade regime is adopted, it is essentially
impossible  to stop special interests  building a case that their sector deserves special
treatment  for one reason  or another.  Returning  to the example  of maize,  if we decide  to
maintain  or raise protection,  we are likely  to find that there is another  important  group of
poor  people  for whom maize  is an important  expenditure  item.
A better approach  is to focus on developing  two different  sets of instruments-one,
trade policy, focused on providing  the incentives  appropriate  for efficient  production  and
use of goods and services, and another, distributional  policy, focused on alleviating
poverty. With this assignment  of instruments,  trade policy can be designed using the
simple, comprehensible,  guidelines for trade policy formulation.  A  set of distributional
instruments will  necessarily have  a  much wider  range of  dimensions, including
investments  in expanding  access  to education,  the provision  of safety  nets, and a range  of
infrastructure  investments  needed  to allow  people  in poorer  regions  access  to the markets
and other  amenities  enjoyed  by relatively  advantaged  people.
27 On this website  the reader  may find the initial  efforts  which  include  Harrison,  Rutherford  and Tarr (2001)
and  other  papers  from  the Stockholm  conference  on Poverty  and  the International  Economy.
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Trade policy  reform  and institutional  strengthening  must be implemented  in the context  of
a variety  of complementary  policies.  Some  of these  are  general  and some  are focused  on
making  the trade policy  reform  more  likely  to benefit  the poor.
Macro-economic  stabilization  and a competitive  exchange rate are essential to
support greater integration  into the world markets. Exchange  rate depreciation  in the
beginning  of major trade reform programs  will facilitate  adjustment.  Great care must be
taken  to avoid real exchange  rate appreciation  at a time of import  liberalization.  As this is
largely  determined  by macroeconomic  and fiscal policies,  it is important  that these are
managed  to be consistent  with  the trade  reform.
Markets.  If markets  are not competitive  or are missing,  trade  reforms  may not benefit
the  poor. Critical obstacles to  the  operation of  market signals must be identified.
Questions  that should  be posed  include:
*  In agriculture,  are prices passed on to farmers,  or are there government  or private
intermediaries  which make  large  profits  in the sale of farm products  or farm inputs?
*  More  generally,  is the reform  likely to destroy  existing  markets  that are significant  for
the poor? Will it allow poor consumer  to obtain  new goods? (For further discussion,
see  Winters,  2000,  2001).
*  Are there  serious  impediments  of various  kinds  (legal,  cultural,  transportation)  to labor
mobility?  Labor market restrictions,  such as prohibitions  on firing of workers, often
result in an informal labor market sector,  with the poor concentrated  in the informal
sector.  Reduction  in the restraints  in the labor  market,  especially  combined  with trade
reform,  can result  in an expansion  of the formal  sector.  This can  have a strong  impact
on poverty  reduction  since the poor will move  from the informal  to the formal  sector
with  the expansion  of demand  in the formal  sector.
- Are there serious financing obstacles  to  participation  in trade? In the long run,
developing  an effective financial  system is a key to development.  In the short run,
trade-focused  instruments  such as the use of back-to-back  letters  of credit may allow
some  of the most pressing  obstacles  to trade  to be alleviated.
- Are there serious obstacles  in setting up a business?  Competition  may be impeded
because it is difficult to obtain a license  to start a new business  or to make an
investment.  Or foreign  investment  may  be impeded.  The reduction  in barriers  to entry,
especially those imposed by governments  at various levels, can be expected to
improve  competition  and allow  entrepreneurs  to sell new cheaper  imports  to the poor
or to provide  services necessary  to bring goods to market. The latter is particularly
important  in cases  where reform  affects  entities  that provide  ancillary  services  to the
poor and may cease  to do so after reform  occurs.  An example  would  be the provision
of transport,  storage  and distribution  services  to farmers  by a marketing  board.  If there
are barriers  to entry into such  service activities,  or entry is unlikely  to occur  because
the market cannot sustain operations,  continued  government  involvement  may be
necessary.
*  Are there  transport  obstacles  to trade? High  transport  costs make  it difficult  to engage
in trade. Landlocked  economies  that are far away from markets  may have little that
they can influence,  both because  of the absence  of direct links and the difficulties  of
establishing  transit arrangements  but sometimes  there are government  policies or
institutions  that can be modified  which would  lower  transport  costs.  Here again  a key
test should  be whether  entry  is feasible.
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of the poor or those located  in outlying  regions,  there may be a need for universal
service regulation. Experience suggests that  explicit subsidies to  achieve such
objectives  can be efficient.
*  Are there serious  trade  obstacles  in entering  major  external  markets  or in competition
from abroad? Most low income developing  countries  face relatively  low traditional
trade barriers in external markets,  given a variety  of preference  schemes;  but there
are specific  problems  related  to sanitary  and phytosanitary  controls  in many  markets,
the threat of contingent  protection  and competition  from subsidized  exports in third
markets.
Trade Related Institutions.  Success  of trade policy reforms involves a variety of
institutions  both public  and private.  On the government  side, an effective  and non-corrupt
Customs Authority is  critical to  the success of  reforms. Other institutions to which
particular  attention  needs  to be paid in order  to ensure  that trade  reforms  benefit  the poor
include marketing  and export  finance.  Both are necessary  for export  expansion.  In order
for the poor to benefit,  it may  be useful  to establish  organizations  such  as a co-operatives
which can put together large enough shipments  from individual  producers to supply
foreign markets; and to  be able to  obtain financing linked to  their exports-which
individual  poor farmers  can not. There  is a lot of international  experience  on these  issues,
including through the  International  Trade Centre and UNCTAD in Geneva. Bilateral
donors  and multilateral  development  banks can provide  assistance  in the design  of such
programs,  as well as financing.
Agriculture  and the Rural Poor. Key issues where complementary  actions may be
required for  poor farmers include the availability  and cost of education for  children;
research  and development;  and infrastructure,  especially  transport  and communications.
Unless the opportunity  costs of farm residents  can be raised, they will stay trapped in
poverty.
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Existing interest groups, often entrenched  elites benefiting  from the status quo, may
oppose  reform.  And if it is agreed,  there will be pressures  to postpone  adjustment  as long
as possible. Recognizing  that this is the likely environment  in which trade reforms are
usually proposed,  it is nonetheless,  extremely  important to investigate  in advance the
impact  of reforms  on specific  groups  of the poor and to design  programs  to address  them.
In such a case, the timing of the implementation  of trade reforms  needs to be closely
linked  to the establishment  of the programs  that deal  with their impact  on the poor.  Some
points  worth noting  about  sequencing  are  the following:
*  If a reform  is preannounced  to be implemented  over a few years and it is a credible
reform, then normal market adjustment  and attrition can be used to  eliminate or
greatly reduce  adjustment  costs. However,  this may come  at the cost of the threat of
reversal  of the trade reforms,  as entrenched  interests  will be granted  time  to mobilize
opposition.  A staged  reform  that is scheduled  to take more  than five years is not likely
to be credible unless it is anchored  in WTO commitments  or a far-reaching  regional
trade  agreement.
*  It is important,  as noted earlier, to address non-tariff  barriers  and high tariff peaks
earlier  rather  than later.
*  It is also important  to reduce  tariffs across  the board  during each stage of a gradual
reform.  If instead  a target is set based  on the tariff  average,  the tendency  will be to cut
34tariffs only where they cause no immediate  difficulty  and leave  all the adjustment  to
last.
*  Broad  trade reforms  frequently  meet with much  less political  resistance  than cuts in
protection  to individual  sectors.  Broad  reforms  help  the winners  from reform  recognize
their potential gains, and tend to reduce the costs even for  industries  that lose
protection  on their  output.
*  Waiting for some important  infrastructure  project to be completed,  such as a port
facility  or a road,  is not usually  a good  reason  to delay  reforms.
Summing  up, not everything  will be perfect  at the start,  but some  minimum,  especially
macro-economic  stability  and a competitive  exchange  rate, should  be in place.  The best
outcomes  for the poor can be expected  when,  as a result  of the overall  reform  process,  of
which trade reform  is a part, growth  accelerates  in the economy  as a whole.  That said, it
must be recognized  that the poor are least  able to bear risks, and that In the short run
there will be losses  for some  groups.  Analysis  of the status quo and the likely impact  of
reform on the poor is therefore  very important.  General  safety nets may not exist or be
inadequate  in many low-income  countries. In such situations reforms should not be
postponed,  but rather should be implemented  gradually, following a  pre-announced
schedule, and complemented  by actions to  minimize  adverse consequences  to  the
poorest  in society.  In many  cases  this can be done  by directly  targeting  trade  policies  that
are currently  clearly  detrimental  to the interests  of the poor,  and ensuring  that the reform
process  also considers  the need  for action  in ancillary  areas  such  as service  markets.
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In order to provide  a schematic  overview  of the various  possible  effects  of a trade policy
reform on the poor, it is useful to distinguish  between  three types of sectors: those
producing importable or import-substitute  goods (M), exportable  goods (X) and non-
tradable  or home goods (H), as well as two factors  of production,  labor and capital.  We
assume  here that the only asset  of the poor consists  of labor,  while  the asset owned  by
the non-poor is capital. The effects of trade policy reform on the poor depend on the
consumption  and production  of the poor in these  three sectors.  The effects  also differ in
the short and long run. In the short run we assume  that the factors of production  are
immobile,  while  they are  mobile  in the long  run.
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We assume  that the country  concerned  is small--it  has no power  to affect  world  prices of
traded  goods-and that labor  markets  function  well in the sense  that that nominal  and real
wages  are  flexible.  Domestic  prices  of M (Pm) and  X (Px) depend  on their  world  price and
on policy variables  such as the exchange  rate and import  tariffs. On the other hand, the
price of H (Ph) is determined  fundamentally  by domestic  supply  and demand.  Allocation  of
resources  depends  on these  three prices.  In the long run, resource  allocation  depends  on
relative  prices  only,  such  as Px/Pm  and PxIPh. 28
Trade  liberalization  (a reduction  in tariffs)  raises Px/Pm,  and labor  and capital  have
an incentive  to move from M to X. Whether  Pm falls or Px rises makes  an enormous
difference  in the short run and is likely to determine  the success  of the reform.  This is
where  complementary  policies  play  a crucial  role,  including  exchange  rate  policy.
Suppose  the nominal exchange  rate (ER) remains unchanged  following a tariff
reduction.  Then Pm falls while Px remains  unchanged,  and labor and capital in sector M
are hurt in the short run. The groups  that are hurt are likely  to lobby  for a policy  reversal.
Also, though in the long run both imports  and exports increase  with a tariff reduction,
imports  tend  to increase  faster than  exports,  with a likely  deficit  in the balance  of trade  that
may be unsustainable.  Both  the pressure  from short-term  losers and the balance  of trade
problem  may result in a failure of the reform.  This outcome  can be avoided  or its effects
are mitigated by  depreciation of  the  domestic currency. This raises the  price  of
importables  relative to non-tradables,  and helps dampen both the increase  in import
demand  and the decline of labor and capital's nominal  income  in sector  M. On the other
hand,  labor  and capital  in sector  X benefit  from the devaluation  since Px increases. 29
Thus, a policy  package  of tariff reduction  and currency  depreciation  should  make  it
easier for the factors  of production  in sector  M in the short run and during  the transition
period, and should  dampen  the resistance  to the reform. In countries  with a flexible or
floating exchange  rate policy, the lower tariff will raise the demand  for imports  and for
foreign  exchange.  This will raise the price  of foreign exchange  or lower  the value of the
domestic currency. In other words, the exchange rate will depreciate (more units of
28 With  three  nominal  prices,  there  are  only  two  independent  relative  prices.  For  instance,  choosing
Px/Pm  and  Px/Ph,  the  third  relative  price  (Pm/Ph)  is obtained  by  dividing  PxlPh  by  PxlPm.
29 A devaluation  has  no impact  on the relative  price  Px/Pm  because  both  prices  increase  in the
same  proportion.domestic  currency  per unit of foreign  currency).  This  is similar  to a devaluation  except  that
it is determined  by the market  and not by the monetary  authorities.  30
The effect of trade reform  on the poor also depends  on the second relative price
PxlPh.  That relative  price  depends  not only on policy  but also on consumer  reaction  to the
policy since it is determined  by supply and demand. PxlPh also rises following a tariff
reduction,  though  less  than  Px/Pm.
When  the value of the nominal  exchange  rate cannot  be changed,  a tariff reduction
has no impact  on Px but lowers  Pm.  This leads  to a shift in consumption  from H and X to
M, and thus to a reduction  in Ph (though  less  than the reduction  in Pm). This implies  an
increase  in PxIPh.  With a full devaluation  equivalent  to the tariff reduction,  Pm remains
unchanged  and Px rises by the magnitude  of the depreciation,  shifting  consumption  from
X to M and H, raising Ph. Px/Ph rises by the exact same  amount as in the absence  of
devaluation. Finally, with flexible exchange rates, the depreciation  is  less than the
reduction  in the tariff, so Pm falls, while  Px rises.  Consumption  shifts  from X to H and M,
and from H to M, so the net effect  on the demand  for H is ambiguous,  as is the effect  on
Ph. Note,  however,  that Px/Ph  rises  exactly  as in the other  two cases.
A.2  Effects on real income in the short run
The impact of trade reform on the poor in the short run will critically depend on their
location  in terms of consumption  and production  (income),  in particular  whether  they are
employed in tradable or nontradable  activities.  There are three cases to consider  that
indicate  the  types of effects  that may arise:
i) Poor  employed  in the exportable  sector.  The relative  price of sector  X increases.
Thus, in the short run, as factors are not mobile  across  sectors, the wage rate of labor
employed  in X increases.  On the consumption  side,  labor (and  the poor,  by assumption)
would  gain as long as they consume  either some  M or some  H or both (since  their prices
fall). Thus, labor's real income must improve; and the higher the proportion  the poor
spend on H and M, the larger  the gains.  Thus,  the real income  of labor in X must rise, or
remain  unchanged  in the unlikely  circumstance  that the poor spend  their entire income  on
the exportable  X.
ii) Poor  employed  in the importable  sector.  If, on the other  hand,  the poor produce
in the importable  sector, a tariff reduction  would lead  to a decline  in the wage of the poor
(labor)  employed  in the importable  sector.  How  much  they would  lose then would  depend
on the consumption  effect:  if they spend  all their income  on importables,  the income  and
consumption  effects  would  cancel  out and  the net effect  of trade  liberalization  on their real
income is zero. However,  if they also consume  X and H, they will lose. The expected
result  is that the poor lose in  the short  run, but their  loss  is smaller  than  the decline  in their
wages, because  of the gains  from the effect  of trade liberalization  on the prices  of things
they consume.
iii) Poor  produce  only in the non-tradable  sector.  With the decline  in the price of H,
the wage rate in that sector also declines  by about the same  percentage.  On the other
30 This  section  employs  a stylized  and  simple  framework  that  abstracts  from  the  complexities  which,
in practice,  are  often important.  For example,  the existence  of unemployment,  the presence  of
intermediates  products  etc.
37hand, labor in H  also benefits  from the lower  cost of consuming  M and H. It is possible
that the impact  on the real income  of the poor  rises  because  the cost of the consumption
bundle  falls more  than  their  wages. In general,  the impact  on the real income  of labor  in H
is ambiguous  and depends  on the shares  of M, X and H in the consumption  basket,  and
on the response  of the price of H to trade liberalization.  The larger  the share of M in the
consumption  basket  of the poor,  the greater  the likelihood  that they will gain. They must
gain if they only consume M, they must lose if they only consume X, and they are
unaffected  if they  only consume  H.
These results are summarized  in  the matrix below. Each cell  in the  matrix
represents  the "location"  of the poor in terms  of production  and consumption.  The first sign
represents  the effect of trade liberalization  on the income  of the poor, i.e. the return to
their assets (labor).  The second sign represents  the effect on their real income due to
changes  in the cost of their consumption  basket.  Thus a "+"  after the "I' sign means  that
the cost of their consumption  basket  has fallen  following  trade liberalization.  The sign in
parenthesis  gives the net effect of changes  in their nominal income and cost of their
consumption  baskets  on their real-income  in different  "locations".  To summarize,  the best
outcome  is when the poor are employed  primarily  in the exportable  sector  X and consume
importable  goods M. And the worst outcome  occurs  if the poor are primarily  employed  in
sector M and consume  primarily  exportable  goods  X.
Table  1: Location  of the poor  and  effects  of trade  liberalization  in the short-run
Consumption
M  X  H  Totala
M  -/+(0)  -I()  -I+(-)  -/+(-)
Production  X  +/+(+)  +/-(O)  +/+(+)  +/+(+
H  -I+(+)  -I-(-  -I+ (°)  -+?
TotaP  ?/+  (+)  ?/-(-)  ?/+(?)
a This  column  gives  the effects  for the poor  that  receive  their  income  from production  in only  one
sector,  but  their  consumption  basket  includes  products  from  the  three  sectors.
t This  row  gives  the effects  for the poor  that  consume  products  from  only  one  sector,  but  receive
their  income  from  the  three  sectors.
Although  the discussion  has focused on trade reform involving  tariffs, in practice
reforms often involve the abolition of  quantitative  restrictions (QRs) such as import
licenses. As discussed  above, due to rent-seeking,  shifting from QRs to tariffs could
significantly  help  the poor.
In the long run, labor and capital are mobile across sectors. Then, trade liberalization
results  in a contraction  of sector M and an expansion  of sector  X. If, as is likely for most
low income  developing  countries,  M is on average  capital intensive  while X is relatively
labor intensive,  then, in the new output configuration  results  in an increased  demand  for
labor and a higher nominal  wage rate. As the prices of M and H fall, labor's real income
rises as well. Consequently,  while in the short run some  labor employed  in M loses from
trade liberalization  and the impact on labor in H is ambiguous,  when factors are mobile,
labor in both sectors  gain. Of course,  for this to apply  to all the poor, labor markets  need
to be integrated.  If they are segmented,  then some  poor could lose,  especially  if they are
38employed  in the import  competing  sector  and are unable  to move.  In order  to ensure  that
the poor are better  off  following  trade liberalization,  the conditions  affecting  the functioning
of the labor  market  are  therefore  critical.
In the analysis  presented  above,  it is assumed  that all factors are fully employed
and  changes  in trade policy  are reflected  in changes  in relative  factor prices.  In practice,
and for many  of the countries  for which  PRSPs  are being  prepared,  there  may be a large
supply of unskilled  labor in the subsistence  sector that can be employed  at a fixed real
wage in the modern  sector. Trade reform may have a positive  impact  in this case, not
through  increase  in the wages  of the unskilled  workers but rather  by reducing  the amount
of unemployed  or underemployed  in the subsistence  sector  and inducing  an expansion  of
the output of the modern sector. Indeed, following the Indian trade reform in 1991,
manufacturing  employment  increased  faster while wages increased  slower than before
the reform  (Winters,  2000). In most  cases,  one can  expect  a lasting  trade policy  reform  to
have a mixture  of quantity  and price effects  on the labor  markets.  But no matter  what the
situation, labor mobility is essential in order ensure movement  of workers from the
contracting and expanding  sectors.
A.4 Sector-specific issues
The above  framework  is highly  stylized  and abstracts  from many  factors  that are important
in determining  the impact  of reform on the poor. Such factors include the existence  of
imperfect competition and  inter-sectoral  dependencies.  For  example, although the
agricultural  sector  is generally  made  up  of small  and competitive  farms,  this is typically  not
the case for marketing and distribution  services.  In a number of LDCs, marketing is
organized  by public agencies or parastatals,  who usually  fix producer  prices at levels
below  world  prices  and do not always  change  them  in response  to changes  in  world prices
or in exchange  rates. For instance,  in some  of the countries  where the devaluation  from
50 to 100 CFA Francs  to the French  Franc  took place,  farm prices  did not at first increase
by the full amount  of the devaluation,  while  the prices of their imported  inputs often did,
and some of the products  farmers consume  did as well. This may have had a negative
impact on the real income of farmers in the short run. Thus, though the framework
developed above is useful in order to understand  the likely  first-order  impacts  of trade
reform on the real income of the poor,  the specifics  of each case need  to be taken into
account.
To continue  with the agricultural  example, an issue to take into account is the
degree to which farmers consume their own output. The greater the share of own
consumption,  the smaller  the impact  of the reform  on the real income of the farmers. If
farmers consume  exactly  what they produce,  then the real income  effect  of trade reform
on them is nil. If farmers  are net buyers,  it is often argued  that in that case  farmers lose
from an increase  in the price of the product  they produce.  This may  well be the case, but
one must also consider  that in order to be net buyers,  they need to obtain additional
income. If this additional  income is obtained  by working  on other farms,  real income  of
these  farmers  need not decline given  that nominal  rural wages  will tend to increase  with
the price of farm products  (or increase  with  trade  reform  in the long run).
39Note:  a number  of these  papers  as well as many  others  dealing  with trade  policy  issues
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